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Abstract While linguists and philosophers have sought to model the various ways in
which the meaning of what we say can depend on the nonlinguistic context, this work
has by and large focused on how the nonlinguistic context can be exploited to ground
or anchor referential or otherwise context-sensitive expressions. In this paper, we
focus on examples in which nonlinguistic events contribute entire discourse units that
serve as arguments to coherence relations, without the mediation of context-sensitive
expressions. We use both naturally occurring and constructed examples to highlight
these interactions and to argue that extant coherence-based accounts of discourse
should be extended to model them. We also argue that extending coherence-based
accounts in this way is a nontrivial task. It forces us to reassess basic notions of
the nonlinguistic context and rhetorical relations as well as models of discourse
structure, evolution, and interpretation. Our paper addresses the conceptual and
technical revisions that these types of interaction demand.
Keywords: situated communication, nonlinguistic context, discourse structure, rhetorical
relations
1 Introduction
Consider the following commonplace exchange. Suppose a man, Peter, comes home
to find his wife, Anne, looking upset. Peter looks at Anne inquiringly, and she says:
(1) Our daughter was sent to her room.
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Just after she says this, she nods suggestively over her shoulder, and Peter, taking
her cue, notices some scratches on the wall behind her. He immediately infers that
the scratches are the outcome of an event of their daughter scratching the wall and
that this event, call it ‘e’, provides an explanation of the punishment described in
(1). The event e can then support discourse continuations, such as (2):
(2) I was cooking dinner.
Here, the inferred event e affects the temporal interpretation of (2): without e, the
discourse (1)+(2) implies that Anne cooking dinner and sending her daughter to her
room temporally overlap, but this is not the message Anne is conveying.
Let Scratches be the discourse above, involving (1)+e+(2). Now imagine a
different discourse, but in the same context. Peter comes home to find Anne looking
upset, but she utters (3) rather than (1):
(3) I moved the table into the living room this morning.
She nods suggestively, just as in Scratches, but then continues with (4).
(4) I had to buy some new paint.
Here again, the inferred wall-scratching event, e′, plays a crucial discursive role: if
we ignore e′, the discourse (3)+(4) is barely coherent. We’ll call this discourse Table.
The fact that nonlinguistic events can influence the interpretation of a discourse
is old news. Nevertheless, the particular way in which e and e′ contribute to the
content of Scratches and Table, respectively, has not been a central topic of research.
In these discourses, the nonlinguistic events do not provide referents for referential
or anaphoric expressions; in fact, their relevance need not be signalled by the
presence of any particular linguistic expression. Nor does the linguistic unit describe
a concurrent nonlinguistic event, a focus of research on modelling multimodal
demonstrations (Stojnic et al. 2013, Forbes et al. 2015). The discursive contributions
of the nonlinguistic events are rather like those of the italicized clauses in (5) and
(6):
(5) Our daughter was sent to her room. She scratched up the wall. I was making
dinner.
(6) I moved the table into the living room this morning and I scratched up the
wall. I had to buy some new paint.
The way in which e and e′ respectively affect the content and interpretation 
of Scratches and Table will look immediately familiar to any researcher who uses 
rhetorical structure to represent the content of discourse. Our goal in this paper is
in part to show that by extending work on rhetorical structure, which has thus far 
focused on linguistically-specified discourse, we can develop a model for discourses 
like Scratches and Table, in which nonlinguistic events somehow contribute the con-
tents of entire discourse units; that is, in which they do not simply provide referents 
for, or otherwise specify the interpretation of, context dependent expressions in the 
linguistic units. At the same time, we also aim to show that despite the intuitive 
connection between (5) & Scratches and (6) & Table, such an extension is far from 
trivial. Using both naturally occurring and constructed examples, we argue that 
the extensions required to model Scratches and Table not only introduce technical 
complications but also require significant shifts in the way that one should conceive 
of discourse interpretation.
We begin in Section 2 by more carefully circumscribing the particular type 
of semantic interactions that we aim to model and by situating our contribution 
relative to other formal and computational work on the nonlinguistic context. In 
Section 3, we introduce a corpus of naturally occurring data that we will use to 
supplement constructed examples like Scratches and Table. Section 4 explores the 
conceptual consequences of our proposed extension, and in particular, the way 
that it requires us to reassess certain notions of the nonlinguistic context and of 
rhetorical relations. Section 5 tackles two problems: first, it shows how modelling 
our motivating examples requires modifying constraints on discourse salience and 
the rules governing the shape of allowable discourse structures; second, it provides 
a dynamic semantic model theory in which nonlinguistic events become part of 
an interpreted discourse structure all the while changing the world of evaluation. 
This results in a different view of the role of semantics in a dynamic, nonlinguistic 
environment. Section 6 discusses further related work on discourse structure.
2 The context sensitivity of Scratches and Table
Our aim is to develop a model for a kind of contextual interaction that is on the 
one hand well-known and complementary to many phenomena studied in formal 
and computational approaches to meaning, but that on the other hand has not been 
systematically modelled within these fields. Modelling this interaction will involve 
looking at two directions of contextual influence: the effects of nonlinguistic events 
on discourse interpretation and the effects of discourse structure on the typing 
or conceptualization of nonlinguistic events. We introduce the first direction in 
Section 2.1 and explain that the mechanism by which e and e′ contribute to the 
content of Scratches and Table, respectively, lies outside the purview of extant 
models of context sensitivity. Section 2.2 introduces the second direction, but also 
explains that a detailed study of how discourse influences conceptualization is beyond 
the scope of this paper.
2.1 From nonlinguistic events to the interpretation of discourse
It is well-known that nonlinguistic events and entities can influence the interpretation
of a discourse. They can serve, for example, as referents for referential or anaphoric
expressions. Suppose that instead of Scratches, Anne had uttered (7) and pointed at
the scratches on the wall while saying this:
(7) Our daughter was sent to her room for this. It happened while I was cooking
dinner.
In (7), as in Scratches, both the scratching event and the scratches that result from 
it contribute to the content of the discourse. Also as in Scratches, Peter must infer 
that the scratches that he sees on the wall are the outcome of a scratching event e for 
which his daughter was somehow responsible. This inference is required for Peter to 
understand why his daughter was sent to her room and what happened while Anne 
was cooking — that is, it is required to compute the references for this and it.
Despite these similarities, examples such as Scratches and Table force us to 
confront challenges that have received little attention in referential semantics. A 
deictic use of a pronoun can simply be assigned an interpretation by an assignment 
function, thereby allowing us to put aside the question of what factors actually 
determine its interpretation and instead address questions such as how to model its 
contribution given a certain interpretation. By contrast, there is no expression in 
Scratches that we can associate with the nonlinguistic event of Anne and Peter’s 
daughter scratching up the wall. Nor is there an expression that triggers a search for 
a nonlinguistic entity. Scratches and Table therefore raise several questions: (i) How 
do e and e′ come to be semantically relevant? (ii) What is their semantic contribution 
to their respective discourses? (iii) Where should these contributions be reflected in 
the logical forms for Scratches and Table? (iv) And finally, how do e and e′ come to 
be associated with the semantic content that they convey? Extant work on referential 
semantics is not designed to answer these questions.
Recent work in computational linguistics and robotics also tackles a different 
set of questions. There are efforts in distributional semantics to learn how to ground 
referents for words in the visually salient scene (Baroni 2016), while work in robotics 
has yielded computational systems that can automatically find extra linguistic ref-
erents for referring descriptions (e.g., Kranstedt et al. 2006, Matuszek et al. 2012). 
The study of multimodal interactions in Human Robot Interaction (HRI) has also led 
to systems that map speech and visual signals into a unified semantic representation 
of speaker meaning in order to estimate intentions and beliefs (Perzanowski et al. 
2001, Chambers et al. 2005, Foster & Petrick 2014). By and large, this work, like 
work on referential semantics, is concerned with nonlinguistic events that serve as 
the denotations of linguistic expressions or linguistic phrases, and it therefore targets
a different dimension of multimodal meaning than that exhibited by Scratches and 
Table, in which none of the linguistic phrases denote e or e′.
In this paper, we propose that the semantic mechanisms at work in Scratches 
and Table are akin to those that have been studied extensively in work on rhetorical 
structure, although this body of work has so far focussed almost exclusively on 
semantic interactions between linguistically-specified contents. In answer to question
(i) (How do e and e′ come to be semantically relevant?), there is no expression that 
signals the relevance of e or e′; it is rather the need to find a coherent relation between 
Anne’s utterance of (1) and her nod that triggers the search for an appropriate entity 
from the nonlinguistic context. In answer to (ii) (What is the semantic contribution of 
e and e′ to their respective discourses?), we propose that the semantic contributions 
of e and e′ are roughly like those of the italicized clauses in (5) and (6):
(5) Our daughter was sent to her room.pi1 She scratched up the wall.pi2 I was
making dinner.pi3
(6) I moved the table into the living room this morning and I scratched up the
wall. I had to buy some new paint.
Accordingly, these contributions interact with the content of the surrounding dis-
course units in roughly the same way as the italicized sentences in (5) and (6) do.
In (5), for instance, the content of the italicized sentence, labelled pi2 above, serves
to explain that of sentence pi1, while pi3 provides background information regarding
what was going on when the event described by pi2 took place. In other words, the
content of pi2 affects the logical form of (5) by entering into two semantic relations:
Explanation(pi1,pi2) and Background(pi2,pi3). In answer to question (iii) (Where
should the contributions of e and e′ be reflected in the logical forms for Scratches
and Table?), we propose that e affects the logical form of Scratches in a similar way,
although pi2 should be replaced with a label ε that stands for the content assigned to
e. The contribution of e′ to Table can be analyzed along similar lines.
Our claim, then, is that e not only affects the interpretation of Scratches, but its 
very structure or logical form. Regardless of how one chooses to represent discourse 
structure — with trees, graphs, or stacks of discourse moves — it is impossible to 
build a representation of Scratches without countenancing a discourse unit that 
describes e. Given these observations, we can formulate a general hypothesis (NDU) 
about the way that e affects the interpretation of Scratches (and likewise for e′ and 
Table):
The Nonlinguistic Discourse Unit Hypothesis (NDU): A nonlinguistic event e 
can affect the interpretation of a discourse by contributing the content of an entire 
discourse unit (i.e., an instance of a proposition), which enters into rhetorical relations
with other, linguistically-specified discourse units. In so doing, e changes the very 
structure or logical form of the discourse, and it can do this without any explicit 
expression signalling its relevance. Rather, its relevance is inferred through the kind 
of reasoning used to infer rhetorical connections between linguistically expressed 
contents.
The main goal of this paper is to extend extant work on rhetorical structure to develop 
a model of situated discourse that takes (NDU) as a starting point. While (NDU) 
might seem very intuitive at first glance, it has nontrivial consequences for discourse 
structure and content that have not been explored in extant work. The sections that 
follow are dedicated to elucidating and modelling those consequences.
In pursuing (NDU), our work complements that of Lascarides & Stone (2009) 
and Stojnic et al. (2013), who have claimed that rhetorical relations play a key role 
in the semantic representation of multimodal interaction. Lascarides & Stone (2009) 
posit that coverbal hand gestures contribute discourse units to the logical form of 
a discourse, and they use rhetorical relations to model their contribution. Stojnic 
et al. (2013) allow nonlinguistic situations to contribute discourse units and posit a 
discourse relation Summary that connects linguistically-specified discourse units to 
situations (cf. topic situations in the work of Kamp (1981), Stanley & Szabó (2000), 
Elbourne (2005), among others). They use these connections to model how utterances 
can affect a salience ranking of nonlinguistic entities. Little is understood, however, 
about the range of coherence relations to which nonlinguistic events can contribute, 
or the nature and interpretation of the resulting structures. Our study expands upon 
this work by examining nonlinguistic events that are neither gestural nor coverbal and 
that are not necessarily salient in the way that topic situations are. We also consider 
a much wider range of interactions between nonlinguistic events and linguistic 
discourse. Finally, we examine the effects of multimodal interactions on global 
discourse interpretation and develop a perspective on discourse interpretation that 
has not, to our knowledge, been made explicit before.
2.2 From discourse to the interpretation of nonlinguistic events
A nonlinguistic eventuality that is observed or inferred from the nonlinguistic context 
cannot serve directly as an argument to a rhetorical relation; it must first be brought 
under a description or conceptualization. That is, it must be assigned a semantic 
content if it is to support inference. In general, however, there are many alternative 
conceptualizations of a nonlinguistic entity, be it an object or an event, and the 
linguistic context affects inferences about which of the alternatives is the most 
appropriate conceptualization on a given occasion. In Scratches, the scratches on 
the wall are understood as the outcome of an event of Peter and Anne’s daughter
scratching up the wall, but in Table, we infer an event for which Anne is the agent. 
The nonlinguistic context remains constant, but the discourses as a whole support 
different conceptualizations of that context. Interpreters need a means for selecting a 
conceptualization that endows a nonlinguistic event with an appropriate, recursively 
structured content in a given context. Question (iv) (How do e and e′ come to be 
associated with the semantic content that they convey?) inquires about the factors 
that determine this selection.
A consequence of the account that we will develop is that the content ultimately 
assigned to e and e′ is inferred via rhetorical reasoning. That is, while nonlinguistic 
events can influence discourse content and interpretation by contributing content to 
discourse relations, information flows in the opposite direction as well: discourse 
structure influences the way that nonlinguistic events are interpreted or concep-
tualized. It is in trying to understand the coherent connections between Anne’s 
utterances, her nod, and the visual environment that Peter will come to conceptualize 
e as an event of his daughter scratching up the wall. In fact, because e is not actually 
taking place at the time of utterance, coherence-based reasoning about the connection 
between Anne’s signals and the wall must account for the inference that there is even 
a salient event that caused the (visible) scratch on the wall. Likewise for e′.
The co-dependence between the task of building discourse structure and the task 
of specifying the content of discourse units is well-known from work on purely 
linguistic discourse and rhetorical structure (Hobbs 1979). Moving to nonlinguistic 
events greatly complicates the latter task, however, because the typing information 
supplied by the nonlinguistic context is far more impoverished than that supplied 
by linguistic specification, and so the range of different possible interpretations (or 
conceptualizations) is greater.
Although we will make some remarks on the relation between discourse inter-
pretation and conceptualization in this paper, a full answer to question (iv), as well 
as a full derivation of the content of either Scratches or Table is beyond its scope 
(though see the Appendix for a partial derivation). Providing such an answer would 
involve developing a model of discourse parsing that ties (probabilistic) models of 
perception of visual data with discourse information. Our main focus in this paper is 
to model the information flow from the nonlinguistic context to discourse structure 
and interpretation so that we have a solid foothold for studying conceptualization in 
the future. In other words, our goal is to develop the linguistic theory that could (and 
we think should) be used to inform a more sophisticated model of visual processing; 
one that draws on the coherence of embodied conversation as well as purely visual 
features. Our work thus complements that of Larsson (2013), Dobnik et al. (2013), 
and Zarrieß & Schlangen (2017), who investigate the conceptualization problem of 
nonlinguistic objects when a single clause or even a single word is uttered in a fixed
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nonlinguistic context, in which the goals and interests of the agents are also clear
and fixed.
If we are right that a successful classifier for visual information must rely on
a theory of situated discourse of the sort that we develop in this paper, then our
results will ultimately bear on the study of referential semantics as well.1 A full
story of reference to nonlinguistic entities will need to confront question (iv)— the
conceptualization problem is by no means unique to our examples. Yet the fact that
this problem rears its head even in the absence of any lexical triggers underscores
our call for a more general model of conceptualization that looks beyond lexical
semantics and composition. In our view, discourse structure is always a major
factor in the conceptualization of the nonlinguistic context, whether or not this
conceptualization serves as the interpretation of a lexical item.
3 A corpus for situated discourse
The semantic interactions between linguistic moves and nonlinguistic events that
we aim to model take different forms and exhibit complexities beyond those we
have discussed informally in connection with Scratches and Table. To facilitate the
discussion of these complexities, we will exploit a corpus of chats taken from an
online version of the game The Settlers of Catan, which we have annotated for
rhetorical structure in the style of Segmented Discourse Representation Theory or
SDRT (Asher & Lascarides 2003).2 Our corpus has numerous advantages, which we
will highlight shortly. First, however, we begin with some background on both The
Settlers of Catan and the particular version of it that was used to build our corpus
(for more details, see Asher et al. 2016).
The Settlers of Catan is a multi-party, win-lose game in which players use
resources such as wood and sheep to build roads, settlements and cities on a game
board. Players acquire resources in various ways, including trading with other players
and rolling the dice. As shown in Figure 1, the game board is divided into hexes,
each associated with a certain type of resource and a number between 2-6 or 8-12.
A dice roll of, for example, a 4 and a 2 gives any player with a building on a hex
marked “6” one or more resources associated with that hex. Rolling a 7 triggers a
series of moves: the current player must move a game piece known as “the robber”
to a hex of her choice and then steal a resource from a player with a building on
that hex. The robber will then stay on that hex until moved in another turn, and its
1 While we do not have space to elaborate on this point here, an account of how discourse relations
influence the interpretation of referentially used expressions would complement work by Andy
Kehler and colleagues that considers how discourse relations influence the interpretation of anaphoric
expressions (Kehler 2002).
2 To view the annotations for the corpus, go to https://www.irit.fr/STAC/corpus.html.
Figure 1 A snapshot of the game board for The Settlers of Catan
presence will continue to impact the game by blocking resource distributions for the 
occupied hex, regardless of the dice rolls.
Figure 1 illustrates the game interface that was used to collect our corpus. This 
particular snapshot is the way the game board looks to the player Simon. We can see 
Simon’s resources in the upper left-hand rectangle of the game interface, but as in 
the physical version of the game, Simon cannot see the resources of his opponents. 
Figure 1 also shows that Simon is preparing to make a trade via a Trade Panel: he has 
prepared an offer to the (red) player Din, but has not yet clicked “Register Trade”. 
The window labelled Game at the top of Figure 1 reflects game events that are public 
to all players. Once Simon registers his trade, for instance, then Din’s response, 
whether he accepts or rejects the trade, will be described in the Game window.
To construct our Settlers corpus, a chat option was added to the online game 
interface, as shown in Figure 1 (Afantenos et al. 2012). A player types in the Chat 
window, and prior chat is recorded in the History window. To encourage discussion, 
players were instructed to negotiate trades in the chat interface before executing an 
agreed trade through the Trade Panel. Interestingly, for the purposes of this paper, 
players took advantage of the chat window to chat not only about trades, but about 
many aspects of the game state. (8) is one example:
(8) 433.0.3 Server william played a Monopoly card.
433.0.4 Server william monopolized wheat.
433.0.5 Server It’s william’s turn to roll the dice.
434 GWFS noooo!
435 Server william rolled a 2 and a 1.
436 Server GWFS gets 1 sheep. LJAY gets 2 wood.
T.K. gets 2 wood.
436.0.0.1 UI GWFS has 4 resources. LJAY has 3 resources.
william has 13 resources.
437 GWFS greedy :D
438 william :D
439 GWFS spend it wisely then
440 LJAY :)
441 LJAY 13! :o
Every turn in our corpus, whether it is a chat move or a game event, is assigned a
turn number; the turn numbers for (8) are indicated in the left column.3 Each turn is
also identified with an agent, as shown in the middle column of (8). For chat moves,
the agent is the player who typed the chat message (e.g., GWFS for turn 434);4 game
events and states are either described in Server messages, many of which were visible
to all players in the Game window, or reconstructed (by our team) using information
from the User Interface (UI). In (8), William plays a Monopoly card, which allows
him to steal all instances of a particular resource of his choice that are possessed by
the other players. In turn 433.0.4, he steals all of the wheat. Both GWFS and LJAY
comment on William’s move. There is some ambiguity as to whether LJAY in 440
comments on the theft itself or on GWFS’ comments in 437. Immediately after, in
441, LJAY comments on the result of the theft: that William has 13 resources.
(8) illustrates clearly the point that we made in Section 2.1 that building a com-
plete and correct representation of a situated discourse can force us to countenance
discourse units contributed by nonlinguistic events. We cannot build a discourse
graph that accurately reflects the connections accounting for the coherence of (8)
using only the moves 434, 437, 438, 439, 440, and 441. In fact, because the Settlers
corpus was not originally created to study situated discourse, annotators were ini-
tially given only the chat moves to annotate for discourse structure. The resulting
annotations were often incomplete—annotators could not find a reasonable point of
3 Annotations of the Settlers corpus have taken place over multiple stages. Game messages that were
added in a later stage are given decimal numbers in order to preserve the original numbering of the
chat and game events that were present in the first stage.
4 Small capitals indicate user names that have been abbreviated to save space or preserve anonymity.
attachment for many chat moves, and so left them as ‘orphans’ (i.e., disconnected) 
in the discourse structure. Turn 434 in (8) was such an orphan.
These observations triggered a second round of annotations in which annotators 
had access to both chat moves and game events, and a comparison of the two rounds 
of annotation has allowed us to quantify the incompleteness of the original discourse 
structures. The results show, for example, a complete reduction in orphaned discourse 
units in the second round of annotations. (The first set of annotations contained 364 
dialogue internal orphans, where dialogue boundaries were principally determined 
by dice rolls,5 and 1501 orphans total out of a total of 12588 linguistic moves in 
the 45 games of the corpus.) While this comparison reflects features specific to the 
Settlers corpus, it also has the general effect of highlighting the extent to which 
nonlinguistic events can contribute directly to discourse structure.
The inability to build complete discourse representations without the game moves 
is not the only issue. The comparison between the two sets of annotations also shows 
that we cannot even reliably reconstruct the partial structures to which the linguistic 
moves contribute. This is because the game events affect inferences about which 
relations hold between even the linguistic-only moves. In more detail, 2006 of the 
9879 discourse connections in the first round of annotations, which were posited 
based on linguistic-only information, were judged incorrect once annotators gained 
access to game moves (for more details, see Hunter et al. 2015). In addition, we 
found that adding the game events affected judgments about the way that chat-only 
moves are grouped together. Sometimes, a group of discourse units work together to 
provide a single, collective argument to a discourse relation. We found that about 
10% of the 1450 groupings of chat moves in the chat-only annotations either changed 
or disappeared, and about 34% new groupings of chat moves (only) were added as 
a result of taking the nonlinguistic context into account. (9) illustrates a common 
pattern in which linguistic moves are grouped together because they jointly cause a 
nonlinguistic event.
(9) 71 T.K. anyone can offer any wood?
72 william sry no
73 GWFS sorry - more 6s and I can oblige then :)
74 LJAY move the robber and sure :p
75 Server T.K. traded 3 sheep for 1 wood from a port.
76 Server T.K. built a road.
5 When there were discourse relations that linked moves across dice rolls, we opted to treat these
contributions as one dialogue.
Intuitively, neither 72, 73, nor 74 is independently responsible for T.K.’s decision to
trade from a port.6 75 is rather the result of his entire failed attempt to trade with
the other players; that is, the first argument of the inferred Result to 75 is a complex
discourse unit composed of 71-74.7 The first graph below illustrates the structure
inferred from the first round of annotations; the second graph illustrates the new
structure that groups moves 71-74 together into a complex discourse unit, indicated
by the box, so that it serves as the first argument to the Result relation. QAP stands
for the relation Question-Answer-Pair.
71
72
73
74
QAP
QAP
QAP
71
72
73
74 75 76
QAP
QAP
QAP
RESULT SEQUENCE
Figure 2 The original graph for chat moves 71-74 (left) and the updated graph,
in which 71-74 form a complex discourse unit (right).
(8) also highlights a great advantage of our corpus: the Server and UI messages
allow us to disentangle the co-dependent tasks involved in more natural examples
like Scratches and Table because they almost always settle the conceptualization
of the basic game events (see Section 2.2).8 This makes our corpus particularly
interesting for researchers in computational linguistics and human-robot interaction,
who wish to empirically study semantic dependence on nonlinguistic events. One of
the biggest hurdles of such a study comes from the fact that the nonlinguistic context
often involves a seamless evolution of perceptual input, yet to study the semantic
effects of the nonlinguistic context, we must be able to individuate semantically
relevant events and objects, and we must be able to assign them an appropriate typing
or interpretation.
The fact that our Settlers corpus largely circumvents the conceptualization prob-
lem is partly due to its game-centered environment: even in a physically embodied
version of the Settlers of Catan board game, the mutually known rules of the game
enable observers to individuate events like dice rolls and card plays, and to describe
6 A port is a particular location on the Catan board where players can get preferential trades under
certain circumstances.
7 Asher et al. 2016 describes the SDRT-inspired annotation of the corpus. For more on SDRT represen-
tations see Section 5.1 and the Appendix.
8 There are some limited exceptions. For example, players can misconceive to whom they are directing
a trade offer. When setting up trades, players are identified by colors, not their names, so such 
mistakes in conceptualization occasionally happen. There are also cases in which a sequence of chat 
moves can affect the interpretation of game events, as in example (12) in Section 4.2.
them in terms of their role in game play. But in a physically embodied environment, 
there would also likely be other linguistic/nonlinguistic interactions that would be 
harder to control. The virtual environment of our Settlers game avoids these com-
plications. In addition, for every game in our corpus, game events and states are 
either already described by Server messages, or easily recovered from UI infor-
mation, meaning that individuation and typing of these events is almost entirely 
straightforward.
Of course, one might worry that because the Server and UI yield descriptions, the 
game events in our corpus should not be counted as nonlinguistic events, meaning 
that our corpus does not, in fact, shed light on information flow from the nonlinguistic 
context to discourse interpretation. We do not think this is a concern. First of all, 
the Server messages that a player sees often fail to fully specify a game event. 
The location of the robber, for instance, is never verbally presented. When a player 
moves the robber, the Server message broadcast to the players in the Game window 
is [player i] has moved the robber, but this does not specify where it has moved: the 
players must perceive that on the game board. In fact, UI information, such as who 
is sitting where, when a turn is ended, and to whom a Trade Panel offer is made, is 
given only visually to the players, rather than encoded in Server messages in their 
Game windows; and players regularly engage with this type of information. The UI 
descriptions found in our examples were reconstructed by our team after the corpus 
was collected, using information in the game logs.
Moreover, the players do not need to rely on the Server messages to know what 
is going on in the game any more than a player needs to rely on a sportscaster to 
know what is going on in a football game. The messages are helpful as a record 
for annotators and for players who might have a lapse in attention, but all of the 
information conveyed by the Server is represented visually to the players. Players can 
tell when the dice have been passed to a new player because a pointer on the screen 
moves to the part of the screen dedicated to that player; other players can tell when 
the Red player gets a resource via the visualised dice rolls and where the Red player 
has built settlements; and so on. The fact that the Server linguistically describes the 
game events might pose a problem if we were studying conceptualization, but as we 
stated earlier, we are concerned in this paper with information flow in the opposite 
direction. We want to know how allowing events such as dice rolls and card plays to 
contribute discourse units in a semantic representation of an embodied conversation 
affects the development and interpretation of a discourse structure, and our corpus 
facilitates this study even if on occasion the players learn about the events via the 
Server messages.
This brings out a deeper point about the nature of the game events: players 
can interact with them in the same way regardless of whether or not they are 
associated with speech acts. This suggests that the distinction between nonlinguistic
and linguistic events is not the only one relevant to the interpretation of situated,
multimodal discourse. What is interesting about the game events in (8) is that while
we understand (8) as an integrated, coherent discourse, the game events actually form
a substructure whose nature is largely independent of the content of the chat moves.
Thus while these events happen to contribute to the content of (8) via their coherence
relations to linguistic discourse units, this is not their raison d’être. The agents clearly
do not make their game moves with the intention that they contribute to the content
of a discourse, but rather with the intention of winning the game. Nevertheless, the
speakers exploit the game events and appropriate them for their discourse purposes,
making the chat moves parasitic on the game structure (regardless of whether we
classify the game events as linguistic or nonlinguistic).
4 Conceptual shifts
Developing an adequate model of examples like Scratches, Table, and similar ex-
amples from our corpus requires rethinking the status of nonlinguistic events and
reexamining standard assumptions about coherence relations. In Section 4.1 we
introduce a distinction between discourse dependent and discourse independent
events. This is relevant for studying situated discourse, but we also explain that
it cuts across the linguistic/nonlinguistic distinction. In Section 4.2, we apply the
discussion of discourse independent events and multimodal interactions to an old
discussion about the role of intentions in interpretation.
4.1 Discourse independent and discourse dependent events
Like most activities, conversations are typically goal directed. Though such goals
might be hard to articulate and we will leave this point implicit here, we take the
intuition to be clear.9 As with most activities, some events that occur during the
course of a conversation will occur in order to further the conversation’s goal; other
events might simply happen to occur at the same time, possibly contributing to some
other goal, independent of that of the conversation. In a situated discourse d, for
example, cars whose drivers are unaware of d might pass on the streets; a busker
who hasn’t noticed d’s participants might start playing music in the background;
a group of people walking by the participants of d might be carrying on their own
conversation, oblivious to the conversations of others in the situation, and so on. Such
events are clearly discourse independent events; they take place in the context of d, or
may have effects that are apparent in that context, but they are not constrained to be
relevant to d. A discourse dependent event e, on the other hand, takes place in order
9 For our theory of goals, see Asher et al. (2017).
to further the main goals of d; had the goals of d been different, e would not have 
occurred, or at least would not have entered into the same discourse connections.
Sometimes, conversational participants will exploit discourse independent events 
and incorporate them into their discourse, effectively turning them into discourse 
moves. In this case, the content, structure, and goals of the conversation will depend 
on the discourse independent events in the same way that they depend on discourse 
dependent moves; at the same time, the discourse independent events will still be 
intuitively understood as occurring for reasons independent of the conversation. This 
kind of asymmetric dependency — in which a discourse depends on discourse moves 
whose existence and interpretation do not themselves depend on the discourse — is 
common in the Settlers corpus. Let’s return to (8):
(8) 433.0.3 Server william played a Monopoly card.
433.0.4 Server william monopolized wheat.
433.0.5 Server It’s william’s turn to roll the dice.
434 GWFS noooo!
435 Server william rolled a 2 and a 1.
436 Server GWFS gets 1 sheep. LJAY gets 2 wood.
T.K. gets 2 wood.
436.0.0.1 UI GWFS has 4 resources. LJAY has 3 resources.
william has 13 resources.
437 GWFS greedy :D
438 william :D
439 GWFS spend it wisely then
440 LJAY :)
441 LJAY 13! :o
In (8), the game moves form a kind of independent structure of their own in the 
sense that were we to ignore the chat moves, the structural connections between 
the game moves would remain intact, and their interpretation, unchanged — the 
raison d’être of the game moves is independent of the accompanying discourse. By 
contrast, the chat moves depend on the game moves in the sense that were we to 
ignore the game events (as we in fact did in the first round of annotations on the 
Settlers corpus), then we could infer different structural connections between certain 
chat moves while other chat moves would be left “orphaned” as anaphoric fragments 
without antecedents. The raison d’être of the chat moves is ultimately to interact in 
a coherent fashion with certain game moves.
The structure S determined by the whole of the interaction in (8) exemplifies 
what we will call an asymmetric dependency. S contains a core C of connected, 
independently interpreted moves that can be distinguished from moves in what we 
will call the periphery P of S. The asymmetry of S derives from the fact that the
moves in p depend on the connected elements ofC in the sense that they presuppose
them for their coherence while C does not presuppose the existence of structures
in P to form a coherent structure. A result of this asymmetric dependence is that
whileC will be a connected substructure of S, the moves in P need not form a single
connected substructure of S but rather a set of connected substructures, each one
connected to some element of the coreC. Accordingly, we can characterize P moves
as “appropriating” elements inC, while elements ofC do not appropriate any part of
P.
While the core of (8) contains all and only the game moves in (8) and its periphery
contains all and only the chat moves, the distinction between asymmetric structures
and other structures actually cuts across the linguistic/nonlinguistic distinction. For
one thing, the core of an asymmetric structure could contain both linguistic and
nonlinguistic moves, thereby forming an interleaved structure—a notion that we
introduce below. Asymmetric dependencies are moreover not restricted to multi-
modal interactions—conversational participants who overhear another conversation
or listen to a public speech, for example, might appropriate linguistic moves from the
external discourse and incorporate them into their own conversation leading to a fully
linguistic asymmetric structure. An asymmetric dependency is not characterized by
the types of moves that figure in its core and periphery, but by the ways in which the
moves affect the development of discourse structure.
Another type of structure manifested by multimodal discourse in which a nonlin-
guistic event can contribute a whole discourse unit is what we will call an interleaved
structure. Interleaved structures feature units derived from linguistic and nonlin-
guistic material that function together on an “equal” basis, contributing together
to causal, narrative, and dialogical (e.g., question answer pair) substructures to the
discourse structure. One frequent case in our corpus is when a trade negotiation
leads to a nonlinguistic trade, as in (9), repeated below.
(9) 71 T.K. anyone can offer any wood?
72 william sry no
73 GWFS sorry - more 6s and I can oblige then :)
74 LJAY move the robber and sure :p
75 Server T.K. traded 3 sheep for 1 wood from a port.
76 Server T.K. built a road.
In this structure, as opposed to the asymmetrically dependent structure in (8), the 
chat moves bring about a change in the game state.
The connections between nonlinguistic events and linguistic moves in an inter-
leaved structure are in many ways like those familiar from purely linguistic discourse.
(10), however, provides another, more subtle example that shows that interleaved
structures are nevertheless different from structures for purely linguistic discourse, 
at least as the latter are normally conceived.
(10) 534 GWFS anyone want to trade their ore for my wood?
535 LJAY nope
538 GWFS it may prove a prudent trade, lj. . .
539 LJAY nope
539.1 Server GWFS played a Soldier card.
539.4 Server GWFS stole a resource from LJAY
540 GWFS apologies. . .
541 LJAY :(
In this example, GWFS has tried, but failed, to trade with LJAY. Despite the warning 
in 538 that it might be a good idea for LJAY to trade, she rejects his trade offer (again) 
in 539. GWFS reacts by playing a Soldier card, which allows him to steal from her. 
LJAY then expresses her disappointment in 541.
A reasonable follow up question to GWFS’s warning in 538 would be Why? or 
Why would it be prudent?. The moves 539.1 and 539.4 answer this question; they 
explain why he said 538. The fact that GWFS plays a Soldier card shows that his 
stealing from LJAY was a planned attack, and after he carries out the robbery, we 
come to understand that he was not merely telling LJAY that the trade might pay 
off for her in the long run, but giving her a specific warning in light of his chosen 
backup plan. Reasoning about the connection between 538 and 539.4 helps us to 
interpret 538.
At the same time, GWFS did not play the Soldier card and steal a resource from 
LJAY in order to explain his warning any more than Peter and Anne’s daughter 
scratched up the wall in order to explain why she was sent to her room. GWFS made 
his moves in order to get a resource from LJAY and to place himself in a better 
position to score a victory point in the game. The raison d’être of the warning was 
to encourage the development of the game in one direction rather than another; 
as such, the warning is internal to the game structure, which yields an interleaved 
structure. At the same time, the explanation that we infer, which is a meta-level 
relation concerning GWFS’s strategy, is external to the game structure. Thus even 
internal moves in an interleaved structure can give rise to asymmetric dependencies, 
when these moves play a kind of double role. So to be precise, when we speak of a 
discourse unit as being part of the core or the periphery, we mean the element as it 
plays a particular role.
4.2 The hermeneutical stance
In the previous section, we saw how Hypothesis (NDU) and data like (8) and (10) 
lead to the existence of asymmetric dependencies and interleaved structures. In this 
section, we consider how these structures impact basic assumptions about the nature 
of discourse relations and structure. We take it to be a standard assumption that if the 
content p of a discourse move m stands in an Explanation relation to the content q of 
a discourse move n such that p provides the explanans, then the raison d’être of m is 
to provide an explanation of q. That is the function of m, and that is why p was added 
to the content of the discourse. Discourse independent events that are appropriated 
in discourse as well as the nonlinguistic events in interleaved structures undermine 
this assumption by contributing arguments to rhetorical relations to which it is not 
their raison d’être to contribute.
This has consequences for an old debate about the role of communicative inten-
tions in discourse interpretation. On one side of this debate are Griceans who hold 
that communicative intentions are constitutive of interpretation: for an interpreter to 
infer an Explanation between p and q, she must recognize that the speaker expressed 
p with the intention of using p to explain q and she intended for this intention to 
be recognized. Thus the reasoning in interpretation flows from inferences about 
intentions to inferences about content. On the other side of the debate are those 
who ascribe a less central role to communicative intentions: an Explanation can 
be inferred on the basis of features of p and q and from there, an interpreter can 
defeasibly infer that the speaker had the intention of using p to explain q (Lepore & 
Stone 2015, Asher et al. 2017). In other words, the reasoning flows the other way, 
from a preferred pragmatic interpretation to intentions.
When it comes to nonlinguistic, discourse independent events and nonlinguistic 
events in interleaved structures, the events do not arise from an intention to com-
municate. Their raison d’être is to make things happen in the world. At the same 
time, we have argued that these events contribute to a discourse structure (or game 
structure, etc.) in the very same way as discourse moves do. We need this claim in 
order to explain the coherence of an example such as (10): the chat moves in 538, 
539, 540, and 541 are intuitively a part of a connected and coherent interaction, but 
representing the coherent connections requires the game moves to contribute to the 
representation of (10)’s structure. These claims together render moot the question of 
whether communicative intentions enter the picture before or after the inference to 
a coherence relation, because the requisite events, and in many cases the inferred 
relations to which they contribute, are simply not produced from an intention to 
communicate.
In our view, semantic structures composed entirely of what are traditionally 
classified as discourse moves (including, perhaps, discourse dependent nonlinguistic
moves) are just a subclass of the kinds of structures that we can use such moves to 
build. In fact, we think that the kinds of semantic structures built up from coherence 
relations need not involve any discourse moves at all. Suppose Peter looks out into 
the garden and sees his cat, Lupin, staring at a pile of leaves. The leaves suddenly 
move, and Lupin pounces. Peter goes to investigate and finds a baby whipsnake. He 
now understands why Lupin was staring at the leaves and why the leaves rustled; 
he also understands that Lupin’s pounce was a result of the leaf movement. Yet, 
neither the snake nor the cat intended to communicate anything, and certainly the 
snake didn’t intend its presence to explain Lupin’s behaviour and Lupin didn’t intend 
his pounce to be a result of the leaf movement. Nevertheless, both the result and 
meta-level explanation are inferred.
Interpreting the asymmetric and interleaved structures in our Settlers corpus often 
requires inferring coherence relations between game events. In (11), the distribution 
of resources in 205 is a result of the dice roll in 204.
(11) 204 Server J rolled a 2 and a 3.
205 Server mmatrtajova gets 1 sheep. Ash gets 1 sheep.
206 mmatrtajova nicee
207 J my dice rolls SUCK
J’s comment in 207 brings not only the moves 204 and 205 into a larger semantic 
structure, but the relation between them as well: J’s dice roll sucked precisely because 
it resulted in a resource distribution for her opponents while yielding nothing for 
her. In other words, by Hypothesis (NDU), 207 is coherently related to a complex 
unit ε , whose content is Result(204,205). But communicative intentions are not 
responsible for ε’s content; indeed, no intentions are, at least not directly. 204, 205, 
and their causal relationship stem from the rules of the Settlers game, but 207 makes 
this Result relation semantically relevant in a way that requires us to interpret it as 
contributing to a larger, asymmetric structure.
When discourse independent events get appropriated and incorporated into a 
larger discourse structure, this process can lead to a re-conceptualization of game 
events analogous to the regrouping of chat events that we observed in (9). Neverthe-
less, the substructure retains its independence in the sense that peripheral moves will 
not lead us to correct connections inferred on the basis of core moves alone; rather, 
one only groups core moves together in new ways. Consider (12):
(12) 154.1 Server GWFS played a Soldier card.
154.3 Server GWFS stole a resource from LJAY
155 Server GWFS rolled a 5 and a 1.
157 Server GWFS built a settlement.
158 GWFS sorry laura
159 GWFS needed clay the mean way :D
159.1 Server LJAY played a Soldier card.
159.4 Server LJAY stole a resource from GWFS
160 Server LJAY rolled a 4 and a 4.
161 Server GWFS gets 2 wheat.
163 GWFS touché
When GWFS types touché, he comments on the fact that LJAY made a successful 
counter move — rather than accepting his apology she “retorted” by attacking him 
back. Interpreting GWFS’s comment in this way therefore requires that we infer a 
parallel structure between LJAY’s complex play in 159.1-159.4 and GWFS’s prior 
complex move in 154.1-154.3. In inferring this connection between complex dis-
course units, we add information to the representation of (12) that goes beyond 
what is strictly required by the game structure alone. Still, the substructure of game 
events — what we have called the core — yields a complete discourse structure C 
that is consistent with this reconceptualization.
The need to infer semantic connections between real-world, noncommunicative 
events has general consequences for the way we think of discourse. Dynamic seman-
tic theories of discourse interpretation are based on the assumption that discourse 
is fundamentally about information exchange, and so concentrate on how speakers 
convey information, looking at questions such as: How does the content of a given 
utterance affect the information state(s) of conversational participants? How does 
it restrict the set of possible subsequent discourse contributions (e.g., how does it 
affect salience)? And how does the packaging of information in a given utterance 
serve to further a larger, information-seeking discourse goal? Once we expand our 
view to the full set of interactions with real-world events, however, we see that the 
set of questions that we must pursue, and thus the models of discourse evolution and 
interpretation that we develop to answer them, must change significantly.
Discourse evolution, for example, is constrained by the salience of discourse 
moves — for a new discourse move to be coherent, it must typically relate to a 
salient prior discourse move (if it is not discourse initial). Once we countenance 
asymmetric structures, we must consider not only the salience of discourse moves, 
but the salience of real-world events, which may very well be unfolding according to 
discourse independent rules and goals. We therefore have to consider not only how a 
discourse move can interact with an isolated nonlinguistic event, but with an entire
structure of nonlinguistic events (or multimodal interactions). Discourse salience 
cannot be understood only in terms of the production of discourse moves, but also in 
terms of how speakers can exploit discourse external events. We explore these issues 
in more detail in Section 5.1.
Discourse interpretation likewise needs to take real-world events into account. 
There is an illustrative analogy with deixis: the interpretation of a deictic expression 
is determined ultimately by the way the world is, not the way that a speaker describes 
it as being, and its interpretation does not vary. A speaker might be wrong about what 
she takes the referent of a deictic expression to be, but the real world has the final 
say as to what the referent is. Similarly, the introduction of a variable and associated 
content for a nonlinguistic event characterizes or describes something that actually 
happens in the world. Once that nonlinguistic event is introduced, it determines an 
intensional content that does not vary with circumstances of evaluation and that 
escapes the scope of operators such as negation or modality. It is this intensional 
content that various conceptualizations may or may not correctly capture, that 
speakers may get wrong or right. But in an important sense, when speakers interact 
with a nonlinguistic event in an asymmetric or interleaved structure, they become 
committed to the event itself, not only to a particular conceptualization of it. And the 
event, regardless of whether conversational participants realize it or not, can limit 
possible discourse continuations and force a discourse to take a turn in a way that no 
amount of discussion can change. We develop this point in Section 5.2.
The interpretation of deictic expressions has traditionally been handled using 
mechanisms that are external to dynamic discourse interpretation: Discourse Rep-
resentation Theory, for example, uses external anchors to fix a unique assignment 
function for deictic expressions (Kamp 1990). Kaplan’s (1989) model of deixis 
is importantly similar: the referents of deictic expressions are fixed antecedently 
by a special character function, and then discourse interpretation can proceed as 
standardly construed. Hunter (2014) and Maier (2009) have already argued for a 
more integrated model of deixis, but the need to take real-world effects into account 
during dynamic discourse update itself is even clearer in the kinds of exchanges that 
we are considering. Simply adding anchoring or character functions is not an option 
in these cases, for there is no expression to anchor. The events are integral to the 
very construction of the discourse.
5 Technical changes to discourse structures
We have argued that building discourse structures for situated discourse is not as 
simple as adding nonlinguistic events to our model and allowing the interpretation 
of our discourse structures to be sensitive to them; we must allow these events to 
contribute contents directly to the representations. Extending our structures in this
way leads us to countenance asymmetric and interleaved discourse structures, which, 
as we argue in this section, require us to revise standard models of discourse structure 
and interpretation. In Section 5.1, we examine the consequences of asymmetric 
structures for discourse structure and evolution. Section 5.2 explores the ways in 
which incorporating nonlinguistic events into discourse content, be it in interleaved 
or asymmetric structures, affects dynamic semantic models of discourse.
To make our discussion more concrete, we will adopt some of the language 
and formalisms of Segmented Discourse Representation Theory or SDRT (Asher 
& Lascarides 2003). Few of the general points that we make in this section depend 
on details specific to SDRT, however, though they do rest on the assumption that 
the content and structure of a coherent discourse can be represented as a weakly 
connected graph that permits long distance dependencies; the consequence of this 
is that a discourse move is coherent in the context of a discourse only insofar as it 
is coherently related to some other (potentially nonadjacent) part of that discourse. 
Details of the formal implementation in SDRT can be found in the Appendix.
5.1 Structural constraints on situated discourse structures
Asymmetric structures are formed when discourse moves interact with an inde-
pendently developing structure to form a coherent whole. This interaction often 
involves discourse units playing the double role of engaging in connections with 
other discourse moves while simultaneously engaging with elements of the inde-
pendently developing structure, which we have called the core. This double role in 
turn requires that we rethink constraints on discourse salience and development: 
whereas these constraints are normally modelled in terms of how a speaker should 
formulate and present her discourse contributions, asymmetric structures lead us 
to ask how a speaker can exploit events in an independently evolving structure to 
achieve her discourse goals. To spell out these changes, we begin in Section 5.1.1 
by defining asymmetric structures, including the notion of a core and a periphery, 
more precisely. Section 5.1.2 then describes two patterns of discourse attachment 
exhibited by asymmetric structures in the Settlers corpus that are disallowed by 
extant theories of discourse. Finally, in Section 5.1.3, we propose a new constraint 
on discourse salience and evolution that takes these new patterns of attachment into 
account.
5.1.1 Asymmetric structures
An asymmetric structure contains a substructure that has an autonomous existence, 
its core, and one or more substructures that are dependent on the core. This set 
of dependent structures makes up what we have called the periphery. To define
asymmetric structures precisely, we therefore need to define the core of a structure 
and its periphery. We begin by defining a discourse graph in SDRT10 — a weakly 
connected graph with directed edges or arrows that are labelled with names for 
discourse relations (e.g., Contrast, Elaboration, Result, Commentary, among others). 
The nodes in our graphs will be either: (i) elementary discourse units (EDUs), which 
we will take to be the contents of linguistically-specified clauses; or (ii) elementary 
event units (EEUs), which are contents assigned to nonlinguistic events in the context; 
or (iii) complex discourse units (CDUs). A CDU is a discourse unit whose content 
constitutes coherently connected discourse sub-units of types (i), (ii) and/or (iii).
Definition 1 A discourse graph G is a tuple (V,E1,E2, ℓ,Last), where V is a set of 
nodes (EDUs, EEUs, and CDUs); E1, a set of edges representing discourse relations; 
E2, a set of edges relating each complex discourse unit (CDU) to its sub-units; ℓ, a 
labelling function from elements of E1 to discourse relation types; and Last, a label 
for the last unit in V relative to textual order.
The core of an asymmetric structure can now be defined as a particular kind of 
subgraph. For a graph G, a core C will be a subgraph G′ of G that consists of a chain 
of edges that connect the first element of G to the last element of G.
Definition 2 Let G = (V,E1,E2, ℓ,Last) be a discourse graph and let i be the initial 
DU in V with respect to the textual order. A subgraph G′ = (V′,E′1,E
′
2, ℓ
G ↾ E′1,Last) 
of G forms a core C just in case: (i) {i,Last} ⊆ V′; (ii) the transitive closure of E′1 
induces a transitive, asymmetric ordering R over V′ in which for every element a, 
other than Last and i, R(i,a) and R(a,Last).
Note that any maximal chain over V, defined in the standard way, is a core, and any 
set of chains over V all with the same endpoints forms a core as well.
When a graph G represents an asymmetric structure, the periphery of the structure 
is the set of edges that remain when we remove a core from the graph. To make this 
precise, Definition 3 first defines the set of edges that is left in a graph G when a 
subgraph G′ is removed from G. Definition 4 makes such a remainder a periphery 
when the subgraph that is removed is a core C. Definition 5 entails that an asymmetric 
structure is a graph with a core and a nonempty periphery.
Definition 3 Let G be a discourse graph, and G′ a subgraph of G. Let End(e) be the 
endpoints of an edge e and End(E) = {x : ∃e ∈ E.x ∈ End(e)}. Let \ stand for set-
theoretic difference, and let End(E1 \ E′1) = V
P (for periphery). Then G−G′ =defn
10 The Settlers corpus satisfies the presumption in Definition 1 that the units are in a total linear order,
but multimodal conversation is generally nonlinear. We eschew this complexity here.
(VP, E1 \ E′1, E2 ↾ V
P, ℓ ↾ (E1 \ E′1), x), with x the last element in V \ V
′ ordered by 
a linear ordering ≺ over V.
Note that G − G′ may not be a discourse graph in our sense in that it is no longer 
weakly connected; nevertheless, it corresponds to a set of discourse graphs. We will 
assume this correspondence below. Note also that for a given discourse graph G and 
substructure G′, G′ and G−G′ may share nodes but form a partition over the set of 
relation instances or arcs in E1.
Definition 4 P(G,C), the periphery of a structure G with respect to a core C, is 
such that P(G,C) = G−C.
Definition 5 An asymmetric structure G is a graph with a core C such that C 6= G.
A core in an asymmetric structure G is like the backbone of G; the periphery on 
its own typically does not form a connected graph. Figure 3 illustrates an asymmetric 
discourse structure, representing the content of an entire situated dialogue. The black 
nodes represent EDUs; the yellow nodes, EEUs. The two red nodes represent CDUs 
and the dashed edges extending from them indicate their members. The top CDU 
(red node) contains the four EEUs (yellow nodes) that result from Dave’s rolling a 
7 (so 94.0.1 and 95.0.1-95.0.3). The bottom CDU contains the EDUs (black nodes) 
101, 103, 104 and 105 that constitute a failed bargaining attempt. The core consists 
of all the yellow EEU nodes plus the four black nodes contained in the bottom CDU.
The periphery in Figure 3 contains two structures. The first is a tree of depth 
one that links the EDU 95 to the EEU 94 in the core; the orange arc indicates that 95 
is a commentary on 94. The second structure in the periphery is a more complex 
tree hanging off EEU 95.0.3, the last EEU figuring in the top CDU. A pink arc, which 
signifies a clarification question, links 95.0.3 with 100; the blue arc following the 
pink arc indicates that the question was answered by EDU 102. The line of orange 
arcs extending from 95.0.3 signifies a series of commentaries made in the two EDUs 
in turn 96 (indicated by brackets), 98, and the two EDUs in 99. Taking the periphery 
away from the structure leaves an intact connected structure, while taking away the 
core from the whole structure would lose connectedness.
Figure 3 illustrates an important structural characteristic of asymmetric structures 
that helps us relate them to other, known kinds of discourse structure in SDRT. The 
periphery of an asymmetric structure with a maximal core is distinguished by the 
fact that there are no outgoing arrows from elements of the periphery to elements 
of the core. Theories like SDRT already countenance the possibility of outgoing 
arrows that extend from an element of a CDU but which do not play a central role 
in the progression of a discourse; SDRT calls such outgoing edges, or subgraphs 
built from them, danglers (Venant et al. 2013). Units contributed by appositive
93.0.2 Server It’s Dave’s turn to roll the dice.
94 Server Dave rolled a 3 and a 4.
94.0.1 Server rennoc1 needs to discard.
95 Dave :D
95.0.1 Server rennoc1 discarded 4 resources.
95.0.2 Server Dave will move the robber.
95.0.3 Server Dave stole a resource from Tomm
96 Tomm Oh. . .
well that’s unkind
97 Server Dave built a road.
98 Dave sorry
99 Tomm It’s okay
name of the game and all that.
100 Tomm Do you get a random one of my resources then?
101 Dave anyone need wheat?
102 Dave I did, yeah
103 Tomm no thanks
104 Dave rennoc?
105 rennoc1 i’m ok for now
105.0.0.1 Server Dave bought a development card.
105.0.1 UI Dave ended their turn.
Figure 3 A dialogue and its asymmetric structure. The core consists of all the
yellow EEU nodes plus the four black EDU nodes contained in the
bottom red CDU node.
relative clauses, for example, generally function as danglers even in discourse 
representations of single authored text. The periphery of an asymmetric structure 
thus resembles a collection of one or more danglers. However, while we do not 
have the space to develop this point here, danglers provided by appositive relative 
clauses or presuppositional constructions typically interact differently with content 
in the core. Speakers often use them to provide more information about an entity 
under discussion, and so the appositive relative clause helps an interpreter to situate 
discourse content in a way that the commentary in our corpus generally does not.
To make the notion of a dangler more precise, we first define a maximal core. 
As the edges in an SDRT graph are directed, the transitive closure of the set E1 will 
yield an asymmetric ordering with a maximal element, namely the first element 
in the ordering. Let us call a core C of a graph G maximal just in case there is no 
substructure A of G such that P(A,C) 6= /0 and A is also a core of G.
Fact 1 Every weakly connected directed, acyclic graph G′ ∈ P(G,C), where G is an
asymmetric structure with a maximal core C, has a maximal element in VC.
Let G′ ∈ P(G,C). Given that G is a directed, acyclic graph, it has a maximal element
mG that is the first element of its core C, by definition. Since G
′ is a substructure
of G, the the transitive closure of EG1 must have an edge (mG,d) for each d ∈ G
′.
By definition of P(G,C), the edges in G′ cannot be in C. Since G′ is also a directed,
acyclic graph it must have a maximal element md . But then any edge (s,md) ∈ E
G
1 is
in EC1 , and we know that there is at least one such edge (mG,md). Thus, md ∈ V
C.
Hence, Fact 1 follows.
Fact 2 Let G be an asymmetric structure with a maximal core C. Then P(G,C)
contains no edges e ∈ EP1 such that e= (a,b), a ∈ V
P and b ∈ VC.
The proof of this fact follows immediately from Fact 1 and the observation that
were P(G,C) to contain an edge (a,b) with a ∈VP and b ∈VC, then P(G,C) would
contain a chain that could be added to C to obtain a core of which C was a proper
substructure. This would contradict the fact that C is maximal.
In principle, a discourse structure can contain several cores; this can happen, for
example, in conversations that include multiple threads (Wang et al. 2011). In our
corpus, however, the vast majority of conversations have one clearly defined core
(given by the game moves and interleaved linguistic moves). In fact, given that the
playing of the game is the primary concern of our dialogue participants (and each
has as his or her overall goal to win the game), we conclude that for every discourse
graph G for our corpus, all of the nonlinguistic game EEUs in G are contained
in the core of G. This asymmetry between the nonlinguistic events and linguistic
moves might be different for other dialogues. Someone using facial expressions and
gestures to react to a speech or story they are hearing, for example, might contribute
to an asymmetric structure if these nonlinguistic movements have no effect on the
associated linguistic moves.11 In this case, the relationship between nonlinguistic
events and discourse moves would be reversed compared with the Settlers corpus:
the linguistic moves would by and large form the core and the nonlinguistic ones,
the periphery.
11 For a real-life example, watch the GIF embedded in the following article from The Washing-
ton Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2017/04/14/5-questions-for-a-
washington-post-reporter-whose-eyebrows-became-a-meme/. The meaning of the reporter’s facial
expressions remains highly underspecified, but we certainly get a clear sense of her overall reaction
to Sean Spicer’s comments.
5.1.2 New patterns of attachment
The asymmetric structures in our Settlers corpus permit discourse attachments that 
yield “rectangular” discourse structures that we have not encountered in previous 
annotation campaigns on single-authored texts and which are not countenanced in 
other coherence-based theories of discourse (indeed, RST is restricted to trees; see 
Mann & Thompson 1987). This attachment pattern arises when one dangler attaches 
to another dangler that extends from a separate node of the core. To illustrate this, 
consider (13), which involves a fragment of a negotiation dialogue that ends with a 
nonlinguistic move:
(13) 341 Server GWFS rolled a 6 and a 3.
342 Server inca gets 2 wheat. dmm gets 1 wheat.
344 GWFS 9 nooo!
344.0.1 UI GWFS ended their turn.
344.0.2 Server It’s inca’s turn to roll the dice.
345 Server inca rolled a 1 and a 3.
346 Server CheshireCatGrin gets 1 ore, 1 wood. GWFS gets 2 wood.
347 GWFS 4 better :)
348 Server inca ended their turn.
(13) yields an asymmetric structure depicted in Figure 4 below. The game advances 
without interference from the chat moves, which provide only commentary on 
the game. The core of the structure is the chain of connected units [341 → 342] → 
344.0.1 → 344.0.2 → [345 → 346] → 348. Intuitively, 344 is a stand-alone comment 
on the dice roll in 341 or the CDU containing the dice roll and the distribution of 
wheat (which is what makes the roll of a 9 disappointing for GWFS); that is, it is 
a dangler. Similarly, turn 347 is a comment on 345 and 346, and it is not picked 
up by subsequent discourse. Unlike a normal dangler, however, it is also intuitively 
related to the previous dangler, 344. In fact, given the established ways in which 
discourse structure is used to constrain the interpretation of anaphora and other 
elided constructions (Hobbs 1985, Polanyi 1985, Asher 1993, Kehler 2002), it must 
be related to 344 so as to resolve the linguistically implicit arguments of the relation 
better to their intuitive values.
Example (14) illustrates the same point, but with a different relation between the 
danglers and an explicit discourse connective. Note that we have not included the 
full game sequence of events that form the core of the structure for this dialogue.
[341 342] 344.0.1 344.0.2 [345 346]
347
348
344
Result Result SequenceSequenceResult Result
CommentComment
Contrast
Figure 4 The discourse graph for (13)
(14) 237 Server dmm rolled a 6 and a 1.
238 GWFS I can’t take another 7.
239 Server dmm will move the robber.
241.0.1 Server dmm moved the robber, must choose a victim.
241.0.2 Server dmm stole a resource from GWFS
244 GWFS because you keep thieving me
(14) is a semi-constructed example. In the original, GWFS says, “also you keep 
thieving me" rather than 244. Still, we find (14) to sound natural, and it perhaps more 
clearly illustrates the rectangular structures we are describing. Turns 238 and 244 
are comments on game events, and so dangle off the game moves; at the same time, 
244 relates to 238 via Explanation, as indicated by the explicit connective because, 
yielding a rectangular structure.
The preceding examples concern structures with maximal or even unique cores. 
When a discourse unit d bears multiple discourse relations to different elements 
d1, . . .dn in a structure G, however, more than one edge (d,di) may serve to define 
a core of G. In such a case, that link is part of one core but perhaps not part of 
another, more minimal core. In addition, the structure that includes those elements 
that involve the main purpose of the dialogue, the playing of the game, may be such 
a nonmaximal core. Thus, a pair of DUs may support one discourse relation in the 
periphery and another in the core.
In example (10), repeated below, we have a concrete example of a relation 
instance r between two elements of the core that is itself part of the periphery.
(10) 534 GWFS anyone want to trade their ore for my wood?
535 LJAY nope
538 GWFS it may prove a prudent trade, lj. . .
539 LJAY nope
539.1 Server GWFS played a Soldier card.
539.4 Server GWFS stole a resource from LJAY
540 GWFS apologies. . .
541 LJAY :(
The failed trade negotiation (turns 534-539) results in GWFS’s playing a Soldier
card and stealing from LJAY (539.1-539.1). As explained in Section 4.1, the chat
moves and the game moves are a part of the game; this is a classic example of an
interleaved structure. In addition, however, we infer an Explanation between GWFS’s
utterance of “it may prove a prudent trade, lj. . . ” (538) and his Soldier card play, and
this relation is not central to advancing the game play; the raison d’être of his move
is not to provide an explanation of his warning, so the Explanation is structurally
independent of the game structure. The explanatory role played by 539.1 and 539.4
towards 538 could be removed without endangering the coherence of the core, while
removing the core from this example would leave us wondering why GWFS asserted
538 and why LJAY is sad in 541.
The graph below gives the representation of (10); the dashed arrow represents
the only game-independent edge in this example. To improve the readability of the
graph, we note that following SDRT and Polanyi 1985,12 we distinguish subordi-
nating edges, which are labelled with names for subordinating relations such as
Elaboration, Explanation, and Background, from coordinating edges, which are
labelled with coordinating relations such as Contrast, Narration (Sequence),13 and
Result. Coordinating edges are generally represented with horizontal arrows, while
subordinating edges are generally represented by vertical arrows. The import of the
subordinating/coordinating distinction will be brought out in the next subsection.
The asymmetric configuration illustrated in this graph is another example of a
structure that is unfamiliar from work on rhetorical structure.
To make the point abstractly, consider a relational structure R with two relations
in R represented extensionally as sets of pairs, i.e., R=({a,b,c},{(a,b),(a,c)},{(a,b),(b,c)}).
Removing one of the pairs, (a,b), will yield two substructures R1 and R2 of R: R1 =
({a,b,c},{(a,c)},{(a,b),(b,c)}), and R2 = ({a,b,c},{(a,b),(a,c)}, {(b,c)}). For
a given discourse unit u with such multiple relations, one of these rhetorical rela-
12 Rhetorical Structure Theory (Mann & Thompson 1987) also has a similar distinction.
13 In our annotations on the nonlinguistic context, we have opted for Sequence over SDRT’s Narration,
as the game events do not figure in a narrative in the traditional sense. However, the semantics of
Sequence and Narration are exactly the same.
534
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539.1 . . . 539.4
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QAP
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Explanation
Figure 5 The asymmetric structure for (10). The Explanation edge (538,539.1),
represented with a dashed line, is the only game-independent (periph-
eral) edge.
tions might be a part of the core substructure, while another might contribute to the
periphery. That one and the same pair of discourse units can be elements of both the
core of an asymmetric structure G and of the periphery of G might seem strange.
Nevertheless, the situation is consistent with our core/periphery distinction, which
yields a partition of the edges in G but not of its nodes.
5.1.3 Discourse salience and the right frontier
Rectangular structures like that given by (13) violate the Right Frontier Constraint
(RFC) for monologue or text (Polanyi 1985, Webber 1988, Asher 1993). The Right
Frontier (RF) is a set of nodes in a discourse structure— the nodes along the right
edge of a discourse graph— that dynamically evolves as a discourse proceeds, and
is designed to track the accessible and salient nodes in a discourse at any given time.
The RF Constraint requires a new node to attach to a node from the RF.14
Normally, a coordinating relation such as Sequence or Result is understood as
pushing the discourse forward, thereby shutting off the accessibility of its left argu-
ment. To make this more precise, we introduce SDRT’s Right Frontier Constraint;
RFCs from other accounts are roughly similar. The RF in SDRT includes (i) the node
Last—which is the node most recently attached to the discourse graph—as well as
(ii) any unit that is superordinate to a unit on the RF through a subordinating relation
14 Attachment to nodes that are no longer on the RF is permitted if the jump backwards is explicitly
indicated by, for example, repeating content that is no longer on the RF or using a phrase such as,
“Let’s go back to the second point that you made”. Asher 1993 calls this discourse subordination.
and (iii) any CDU that includes a node on the RF.15 Definition 6 formalizes this 
definition, using the definition of a discourse graph from Definition 1. Definition 6 
defines those nodes x on the RF of an SDRT graph G, written RFG(x), which are 
accessible for the next unit to rhetorically attach to:
Definition 6 Let G = (V,E1,E2, ℓ,Last) be a discourse graph; ∀x ∈ V, RFG(x) iff (i) 
x = Last; or (ii) ∃y ∈ V RFG(y) and ∃e ∈ E1, e(x,y) and Sub(e); or (iii) RFG(y) and 
∃e ∈ E2, e(x,y).
The definition of the RF entails that attaching to the RF via a subordinating 
(Sub) relation places both arguments on the RF, but attaching via a coordinating 
relation removes the first argument from the RF, leaving it inaccessible for further 
rhetorical qualification. Many of the rectangular structures in our corpus violate this 
constraint. The rectangular structure produced by (13), as pictured in Figure 4, is 
one example: the Result and Sequence relations intervening between 342 and 345 
should render 344 inaccessible to future discourse moves, yet the comment in 347 is 
still interpretable as standing in a Contrast relation with 344.
If we look more closely at the rectangular structures in the Settlers corpus, we 
see that coordinating relations between nonlinguistic events do not necessarily shut 
off the accessibility of prior nonlinguistic events, either, which gives rise to further 
violations of Definition 6. Examples like (12), repeated below, are frequent in our 
corpus. In (12), turn 155 is attached to 154.1-154.3 via Sequence. The attachment of 
155 should render 154.1-154.3 inaccessible, yet the Explanation provided by 159 
makes clear that 158 should be understood as a Comment on those earlier moves. 
Likewise, 163 is understood as a Comment on 159.1-159.4 despite the intervening 
coordinating relations.
(12) 154.1 Server GWFS played a Soldier card.
154.3 Server GWFS stole a resource from LJAY
155 Server GWFS rolled a 5 and a 1.
157 Server GWFS built a settlement.
158 GWFS sorry laura
159 GWFS needed clay the mean way :D
159.1 Server LJAY played a Soldier card.
159.4 Server LJAY stole a resource from GWFS
160 Server LJAY rolled a 4 and a 4.
161 Server GWFS gets 2 wheat.
163 GWFS touché
15 The RFC is a constraint on accessibility and as such, it generally fails to predict the node to which
the current unit will attach. The full definition of the constraint on accessibility is further complicated
by the presence of the relations Contrast and Parallel, but we gloss over that here.
At the same time, while rectangular structures show that the structure of game moves
does not effect the development of a chat in the way predicted by Definition 6, we
should not conclude that the structure of game moves is entirely irrelevant to chat
development. Consider (15), a minimal variant of (12).
(15) 159.1 Server LJAY played a Soldier card.
159.4 Server LJAY stole a resource from GWFS
160 Server LJAY rolled a 4 and a 4.
161 Server GWFS gets 2 wheat.
162 GWFS finally some wheat
163 GWFS touché
The introduction of 162 in (15) makes it far more difficult to return to the prior
Soldier card event, thereby making 163 less coherent in (15).
The discussion of (12) and (15) brings out a general point about situated dis-
course. The original RFC, conceived as a constraint on how a speaker should present
information and as a constraint on monologue and text, has strong empirical support
(Polanyi 1985, Afantenos & Asher 2010). In situated discourse, however, the devel-
opment of a discourse is not always under the speaker’s control. We need to recast
constraints on discourse attachment as constraints not only on how information
can be presented, but on how it can be exploited. Already, moving to multi-party
dialogue introduces complications for the RFC not only because speakers can engage
in multiple, separate threads of conversation (see also the interruption moves from
Polanyi 1985), but also because an interlocutor might not agree that information
that a speaker has presented as the most salient is the information that should be
discussed in the subsequent discourse. Consider the following constructed example:
(16) 100 T.K. Anyone want ore for sheep?
101 GWFS I’m not giving up my sheep for now.
lj might want to give some of hers, though.
102 GWFS ?? Not for all the ore in the world.
Had GWFS only uttered (typed) the words in bold in 101, the move in 102 would
have been coherent. Once he utters the words in italics, however, accessibility of the
boldface move is shut off, as the two moves are related via Contrast, making 102
highly anomalous. Surprisingly, however, move 102′ in (17) is perfectly felicitous
even though it builds directly off the boldface move, ignoring the italicized move.
(17) 100 T.K. Anyone want ore for sheep?
101 GWFS I’m not giving up my sheep for now.
lj might want to give some of hers, though.
102′ T.K. What if I offer you two ore?
This is, we think, because T.K. is not immediately committed to the discourse 
structure that GWFS builds: he can effectively ignore some aspects of GWFS’s prior 
commitments while addressing others with his own move.
More generally, if an interlocutor has not had a chance to object to a speaker’s 
development of a discourse, he cannot be taken to be committed to the discourse 
structure that a speaker has laid out. Once the interlocutor utters something that builds 
off of that structure, however, he indicates his commitment to the structure up through 
that point. Interactions in our Settlers corpus indicate that something similar happens 
with multimodal interactions: the very fact that one event occurs in a sequence after 
another event does not mean that it will be more salient for interlocutors observing 
the events. Once a speaker chooses to appropriate a nonlinguistic event for the 
purposes of conversation, however, she makes that event salient and thereby commits 
to a salience ordering over the structure of the events leading up to that salient point.
To extend the RFC to asymmetric structures,16 we combine this general observa-
tion about discourse with our observations about rectangular structures. We propose 
the following hypothesis: a discourse unit m in the core C of a graph G for an asym-
metric structure will remain accessible to a new move n in the periphery of G so long 
as no commentary is made on m or any move from C that is subsequent to m— this 
is regardless of whether m corresponds to a linguistically-specified clause (i.e., m is 
an EDU), a nonlinguistic event (EEU), or an extended unit consisting of (coherently 
related) sub-units (CDU). In addition, all of the nodes on the RF of the periphery will 
remain accessible to n. Once the content of a linguistic move n is attached to a node 
m from C, however, then the RF of the preceding discussion disappears, unless n 
attaches to it as well, and all nodes in C that should be inaccessible from m according 
to Definition 6 also become inaccessible to n.
Definition 7 for a revised right frontier (RRF) below formalizes these observa-
tions.
Definition 7 Let G = (V,E1,E2, ℓ,Last) be an asymmetric discourse graph; let 
Acc(G) be the set of labels on the RF of a graph G as in Definition 6, and let 
G
c = (Vc,Ec1,E
c
2, ℓ
c,Last) be the maximal core of G. Then: RRF(G) = Acc(G − 
G
c) ∪ {u ∈ Vc : ¬∃e ∈ (E1 \ Ec1) ∃y ∈ V
c(y ∈ End(e) ∧ u ≺ y)}
This definition captures the idea that in situated conversation, nonlinguistic events 
constrain coherent discourse progression only when speakers choose to exploit them 
in the conversation. Interactions between noncommunicative, nonlinguistic events 
are not in and of themselves controlled by salience constraints; such events generally
16 This extension might be best suited for asymmetric structures with a largely nonlinguistic core. We
have not done empirical work on asymmetric structures with linguistic cores, and it may be that while 
certain violations of the classic RFC are allowed for such structures, they nevertheless impose stricter 
conversational principles than asymmetric structures with nonlinguistic cores.
unfold according to a different set of rules, such as those governed by physical laws
or, in the case of our corpus, proper game play. Once speakers appropriate them as a
part of their message (by making linguistic moves that coherently connect to them),
these events enter into structural relations with other discourse units and speakers
are responsible for how they build that structure every bit as much as an author of a
newspaper article is responsible for structuring the information that she presents.
In effect, discourse participants make EEUs salient— that is, they determine how
these events are brought into the Right Frontier—via their decisions on what they
talk about. This is clearly not all there is to say about salience: specifically, it ignores
how visual salience affects accessibility and reference description (see, for instance,
Clarke et al. 2015). But we leave this topic for another time.
5.2 The semantics of situated discourse structures
While interleaved structures will be subject to the RFC defined in Definition 7, they
highlight a different limitation of extant theories of discourse. Consider (18):
(18) 123 dmm anybody willing to give me a wood?
i can trade clay or ore for it
124 GWFS no woods sorry
126 inca sorry, none here
127 LJAY illl have a clay for one
127.0.1 dmm made an offer to trade 4 clay for 1 wood from
the bank or a port.
128 Server dmm traded 4 clay for 1 wood from the bank.
129 LJAY or not
130.0.1 UI dmm ended their turn.
131 dmm oh well
After receiving two refusals to his offer, dmm trades all of his clay with the bank 
before waiting for LJAY’s response. (We assume that he had started setting up his 
offer and so missed her reply in the chat window.) Once dmm does this, the trade is 
no longer a possibility, as he has traded all of his clay away. He regrets his decision, 
as we see in turn 131, but there is nothing that either he or LJAY can do to repair 
this situation given that dmm is out of clay and then ends his turn; all they can do is 
talk about it, which they do in 129 and 131. In other words, once dmm shuts off the 
possibility of the trade (in move 128), LJAY’s offer still remains salient in terms of 
the RFC, but certain types of continuations are shut off on the basis of the game’s 
structure — dmm cannot now accept LJAY’s offer because he’s out of clay and he’s 
ended his turn.
This observation brings out a semantic point deeper than Hypothesis (NDU).
(NDU) is consistent with a modular approach to discourse structure that can represent 
the coherent connection between a sequence of EEUs and a sequence of EDUs in 
order to represent the entire semantic content of an interaction; it is, for example, 
consistent with a case in which interlocutors discuss a problem, formulate a plan, 
then carry out the plan via nonlinguistic actions and then come back to comment on 
or discuss the events that took place, and so on. While we have known for a while that 
discourse structure is generally not isomorphic to an externally given plan structure 
(Moore & Paris 1993), this modular approach to negotiations is still largely assumed 
(as, for instance, in classic work on bargaining, such as Osborne & Rubinstein 1990).
(18) shows that even this kind of modular approach to interaction is too simple. In 
our interleaved structures, the modular approach breaks down, because linguistic 
discussion that would bear on future actions might be unfinished at the point at 
which a nonlinguistic action eliminates options that the linguistic discussion would 
have made optimal. It is not simply that we must incorporate the semantic contents 
of certain nonlinguistic events into semantic structures in order to capture the full 
content of an interaction; we also need to rethink the update mechanisms involved in 
interpreting these structures.
In classic dynamic semantics, a context or information state is a set of worlds 
or variable assignment functions, a set of world-assignment pairs, or a set of such 
sets (Groenendijk et al. 1996). Update with an assertion changes a given context 
generally by removing worlds from the incoming set that are incompatible with its 
content: that is, successive interpretations of contexts in a set C induce a monotone 
decreasing function f on the world components Cw of those contexts C. In other 
words, for any cw ∈ Cw, f (cw) ⊆ cw.
Of course, in a conversation, interlocutors might hear or interpret things said in a 
discourse in different ways, or one interlocutor might simply not believe something 
that another speaker said, and so refuse a proposed update to the context. For this 
reason, more recent dynamic accounts of discourse interpretation allow each inter-
locutor in a discourse to have her own, dynamically evolving representation of the 
discourse. Ginzburg (2012) proposes individual dialogue gameboards for different 
participants, and SDRT tracks individual commitments using distinct representations 
(Lascarides & Asher 2009) or dynamic modal operators (Venant & Asher 2016), to 
give just a few examples.
While these accounts provide a rich and powerful arena for defining how moves 
in a dialogue affect dynamic information growth, they all in effect assume that the 
space of possible updates is determined by what can be said in a discourse, or by 
the content of each interlocutor’s representation of, and commitments to, what has 
been said. The actual world plays a very passive role in the various definitions of 
discourse update to date: if the actual world figures in the set of worlds that survive
update with a proposition p, then p is true; if it doesn’t, then p is false. But p’s being
false has no effect on the way the discourse can proceed; all that matters is whether
discourse moves are consistent with one another. Speakers are free to say whatever
they want, and be wrong. The real world doesn’t impinge at all on conversational
continuations.
While speakers are free to say things that are false, when the contents of events
that are actually taking place in the world start to interact with discourse moves,
the actual world begins to play a much more active role in limiting possible con-
tinuations. The actual world cannot be inaccurate, nor can it be inconsistent. Once
dmm gives his clay to the bank in (18), he cannot give any clay to LJAY later on,
unless he first gets more clay.17 This affects possible continuations of speech acts.
Before dmm trades his clay away, he could have responded to LJAY’s answer with
an offer to trade and she could have accepted the trade, which would have left dmm
in a strategically preferable position. Once dmm trades his clay away, a continuation
of the game in which he gives his clay to her is no longer possible. Both dmm and
LJAY are free to talk about the offer and build linguistic continuations off it, but this
discussion is inert with regard to game development. In other words, moves building
on LJAYS’s response can only contribute to the periphery of an asymmetric structure.
The world is not there simply for interlocutors to reflect on and learn about; if we
are too slow in our discussions, we are liable to find that the world has moved on
without us, and we will need to readjust the set of possibilities.
Once the contents of nonlinguistic actions are a part of the semantic representa-
tions of multimodal interactions, as we have proposed they should be in this paper,
then these limitations on update need to be made explicit. Dynamic update must
involve not only an evolution of the set of possible worlds, but also a dynamic evolu-
tion of the worlds themselves. For our conversationalists, the world changes as time
goes on, in part due to their actions, in part due to physical processes.18 The actual
world allows for certain possible futures, in virtue of which we decide to act. But
once we act, some of those possibilities become closed off. To make this concrete,
we introduce three new ingredients into our dynamic semantic models. First, we
add a function h that maps each world w to a history, where a history is a finite
sequence of events that occur in w. Second, we add a set of rules L that constrains
17 In fact, it’s not even true that the set of possible continuations is entirely open for linguistic contexts.
Once you have said something, you cannot unsay it. You can claim or even believe that you never
said it, but there is no continuation of the actual linguistic context in which you never made that
commitment. Speech acts change the truth about what was said, but they, like nonlinguistic events,
also change the world and potentially the truth of one’s first order commitments. This fact about
speech acts, however, is not usually of central concern in the development of discourse models.
18 Note that this makes the actual world, indeed all worlds, a kind of branching structure; for the Settlers
corpus the actual world is the game tree plus possible conversational events, which gets whittled
down as the players play.
how histories can develop; in a model of Settlers for instance, L determines the 
legal game sequences. Finally, we need to link the events denoted by DU labels 
with the contents associated with them in logical form. For this we add a relation 
Sw that links the denotation of each DU or EU to a semantic content in a world w. 
Because EDUs and CDUs formed from them express propositions that are not about 
the speech acts these DUs themselves denote, we cannot make use of Davidson’s 
(1967) proposal about action sentences to handle this linking. On the other hand, 
EEUs are different: the formula that provides their content does characterize them, 
and so we can make use of Davidson’s proposal for EEUs. That is, where ε is an 
EEU, a formula of the form ‘ε : φ ’ means that φ characterizes the eventuality itself 
(as opposed to characterizing content conveyed by a speech act).
More precisely, we assume a linear temporal order ≤t over EEUs ε derived from 
their ordering in situated conversation; thus εn ≤t εm for n < m (cf. Section 5.1.3). A 
model A for a graph G representing a conversation with n players will then be a tuple 
A = 〈Di,De,W,C1, . . . ,Cn,S,L,h〉, where Di is the domain of individuals including a 
set of players, De is the domain of events, W is the set of worlds, and for each player 
i, Ci is an accessibility relation. h : W → (P(De))∗ is a function giving the “history” 
of a world, where (P(D))∗ is the set of all finite sequences of sets of eventualities. 
hm(w) is the history of w restricted to the first m moments. Assignment functions 
will map individual variables into Di and DU variables into De.
Update with the content of an EEU will proceed in contexts that consist of an 
assignment function f and a world w, where w determines a set of commitment 
slates Ci(w) for each player i and a history h(w). Let a formula of the form ‘ε : φ ’ 
mean that ε is characterized by the content φ . Then an EEU ε : φ , where ε occurs 
at moment n (written εn) will update the context by minimally: (i) extending the 
assignment function f to an assignment f ′ whose domain is that of f plus εn;
(ii) shifting the world of evaluation w to a world w′ such that (a) w′ complies 
with L and f ′(εn) ∈ hn(w′) ( f ′(εn) is included in the set of eventualities at n) and 
hm(w) = hm(w′),∀m < n (i.e., the past history remains unchanged), and (b) (w′, f ′) 
verifies φ . This means that while worlds in the update may differ on commitments and 
perhaps even what events they contain, they must all contain the events introduced 
by DUs in the order in which they were introduced. Our procedure guarantees that 
the actual world remains in the context set upon EEU update.
Update with EDUs works analogously; an update with an EDU or EEU transforms 
the world — the world has an event in it that it did not have before. However, EDUs 
and EEUs differ in an important respect: unlike EEUs, a world w with the appropriate 
history and assignment f need not satisfy the content φ associated with an EDU pi 
in the SDRT formula pi : φ (i.e., its context change potential lacks conjunct (b) in 
clause (ii) above). Interlocutors are still free to say and to commit to contents that 
are false. Details are in the Appendix.
As situated conversation is still conversation, we need to also say something
about how commitments evolve in our model. A player i’s commitments at a world
w change when updated with an SDRT formula pi i : φ . We take a minimal view to
commitment change made by discourse actions here.19 We assume that i at least
publicly commits to the conventional meaning of her verbal message and to the fact
that her speech act pi i has the content assigned to it by the semantics. In addition,
an interpreter j who exploits a discourse move pi by speaker i to link her own
contribution to the conversation will commit that i commits to the content of pi; in
particular, if j links i’s contribution pi with a relation R to some other DU ρ , j will
commit to R(ρ,pi) but also to the content that i commits to pi . i may interpret matters
differently and claim she was committed to something different. Her SDRS for the
conversation would then differ from j’s (Lascarides & Asher 2009).
With regard to EEUs, no speaker need commit to the basic content φ of an EEU
ε : φ , unless: (i) she is causally responsible for ε , or (ii) she makes ε part of the
discourse structure by relating it to another DU ρ via a discourse relation R. In the
latter case, i commits to the content of R(ε,ρ), which in turn might commit her to
the content associated with ε , depending on whether R is a relation that entails the
dynamic conjunction of the contents of the units it connects, or not. Most moves that
involve relations to EEUs, like Result, Explanation and QAP, are veridical, which
means they do entail the dynamic conjunction of the contents of their arguments.
To illustrate our semantics, let’s return to (18).
(18) 123 dmm anybody willing to give me a wood?
i can trade clay or ore for it
124 GWFS no woods sorry
126 inca sorry, none here
127 LJAY illl have a clay for one
127.0.1 dmm made an offer to trade 4 clay for 1 wood from
the bank or a port.
128 Server dmm traded 4 clay for 1 wood from the bank.
129 LJAY or not
130.0.1 UI dmm ended their turn.
131 dmm oh well
Turn 123 introduces a question that commits dmm to two possible (sets of) continu-
ations, one in which someone gives him a wood and one in which no one does. The
second sentence of 123 introduces an elaboration on the exchange dmm envisions.
Turns 124 and 126 commit GWFS and inca to the fact that dmm has so committed
and they also commit to not offering him a wood. In turn 127, on the other hand,
19 For a full treatment of nested, higher-order commitments, see Venant & Asher 2016.
LJAY commits to a continuation in which she does the exchange with dmm. In our 
semantics, the actual world is still compatible with this exchange happening, in the 
sense that the actual world is an element of the continuation in which the exchange 
takes place. However, in turns 127.0.1 and 128, dmm sets up and completes a trade 
with the bank. Our semantics predicts that the world now changes or shifts, and 
some possible continuations in which the actual world figured prior to the exchange 
with the bank are no longer possible. In particular, dmm has given away all his clay 
and so he cannot trade with LJAY even though he intended to trade with someone 
and LJAY was willing.
The discourse structure partially models this, since it features the relation 
Result(pi ,127.0.1), where pi is a CDU consisting of the (coherently related) seg-
ments 123-126. The semantics of this relation entails that pi’s two negative responses 
to the trade offer cause the nonlinguistic action described in 127.0.1 of dmm trading 
with the bank. It also implies that dmm commits to the negative responses by GWFS 
and inca as well as to the result relation between this (failed) trade negotiation and 
her bank trade. But this also means that dmm does not commit to LJAY’s response 
in 127. We note that given the way the semantics is set up in the Appendix, nei-
ther GWFS nor inca need commit to the result or the bank trade offer, as intuitions 
dictate (they might not have been paying attention). In 129, LJAY commits to the 
new real-world event of the bank trade by commenting on it. Finally, in 131, dmm 
now realizes his mistake; by commenting on LJAY’s turn in 127, he commits to her 
positive response to his offer.
6 Related work on discourse structure
Much of this paper has been dedicated to a discussion of how semantic interactions 
with nonlinguistic events can give rise to new kinds of semantic structures with their 
own constraints on discourse evolution and interpretation. It complements work 
on multi-party dialogue that has compared features of multi-party dialogue with 
monologue (Ginzburg & Fernández 2005) and that has explored the behaviour of 
conversational threads (Elsner & Charniak 2011). It also complements work by 
Goffman (1981), who noted that there may be participants in a conversation d that 
are not “ratified” by the active participants in d.20 These participants may eavesdrop 
on d and then exploit elements of d in their own conversation; for their conversation, 
moves in d are discourse independent, as we discussed earlier. Our work extends and 
complements this earlier work by making explicit different structural possibilities 
that arise in situated discourse, and by investigating the consequences of such 
interwoven discourses for the study of discourse more generally.
20 For further discussion see Dynel 2010.
Our work also extends research by Lascarides & Stone (2009) on the rhetorical
structure of conversation with co-speech gesture and by Stojnic et al. (2013) on
descriptions of unfolding events. Nonlinguistic events are less constrained in their
possible rhetorical roles than co-speech gestures; Lascarides & Stone argue, for
instance, that one cannot coherently use Contrast to connect a gesture to its coverbal
speech, while our Settlers corpus has many instances of nonlinguistic discourse units
participating in Contrast relations, of which (19) is one example:
(19) Server: player i made an offer to trade 1 wheat for 1 sheep from j
player j: But I don’t have any sheep.
Stojnic et al. (2013) focus their analysis on a particular kind of coherence relation 
between linguistic and nonlinguistic moves: a relationship they call Summary, in 
which the linguistic move describes what is currently happening in the (visual) 
embodied environment. This specific relationship between language and vision 
also underpins existing multimodal parsing technologies trained on videos and 
captions (Yu et al. 2015). In addition, there are systems supporting embodied human 
robot interaction which use a combination of language and vision to recognise 
the current state and the user’s intentions, which in turn influences the robot’s 
decisions about which actions to perform (Foster & Petrick 2014, Forbes et al. 
2015, Liang 2005). These systems effectively combine a natural language instruction 
with evidence from the visual scene to help specify the specific robot motions that 
the user requires, and a major part of this process involves grounding the natural 
language symbols to visually salient entities. Our corpus and examples like Scratches 
and Table illustrate that nonlinguistic events enter into a wider range of coherence 
relations than this. Further, this prior work on video captions and HRI focusses on 
single isolated utterances and their relationship to the visual scene, and so it has 
largely bypassed the need to study how the discourse structure of a prior extended 
multimodal conversation, of the kind that the Settlers corpus exhibits, constrains 
successive coherent dialogue moves. These two dimensions to multimodal meaning 
have been the main focus of our paper: we have explored in detail how incorporating 
a wide range of coherence relations into the structure of an extended multimodal 
conversation calls for revisions as to what structures are possible and the model 
theory for interpreting them.
An alternative to using SDRT to spell out the details of our analysis might be to 
use a Question Under Discussion (QUD) model, such as those proposed in Ginzburg 
2012 or Roberts 2012. It is worth noting, however, that some motivations for adopting 
a QUD model do not apply to our data. For example, exploiting question-answer 
congruence to constrain focus (Halliday 1967, Roberts 2012) is not relevant when 
the contents associated with nonlinguistic events do not have a focus structure in
any obvious way. There is also an important lack of parallel between the way in 
which the kind of EEUs that we have explored become integrated in a discourse 
structure and the means by which QUDs are posited to contribute to discourse. 
Explicit QUDs are uncontroversially linguistic, but one should also distinguish 
implicit QUDs from nonlinguistic events. Firstly, most nonlinguistic events cannot 
naturally be construed as questions, implicit or otherwise. Secondly, implicit QUDs 
are semantic contents inferred on the basis of information structural properties of 
explicit utterances or by considering the relation between two explicit utterances 
(van Kuppevelt 1996) — they are not the contents of events of any sort, and so cannot 
be expected to have the same effects on update as the nonlinguistic events with which 
we have been concerned in this paper. The latter cannot in general be inferred based 
on the surrounding linguistic moves. In Scratches, for instance, Anne’s utterances 
no doubt influence Peter’s conceptualization of the scratch on the wall, but without 
the perception of the scratch itself, no amount of reasoning will help Peter figure out 
why Anne punished their daughter.
These differences aside, QUD, like SDRT, has served to analyze a variety of 
anaphoric and elided expressions featured in conversation, including sentence frag-
ments (Ginzburg & Sag 2001, Ginzburg 2012). Many of the contributions linked 
by Comment in our corpus are sentence fragments or incomplete utterances. Like 
us, Ginzburg posits that incomplete utterances have as a part of their semantics an 
anaphoric dependency, and for QUD models this is resolved by linking the fragment 
to questions that are accommodated as the discourse proceeds, and that determine 
what the discourse is about.
While to our knowledge there is no QUD-based analysis of the semantic con-
tribution of nonlinguistic events to discourse, given the parallels that can be drawn 
between Ginzburg’s treatment of sentence fragments in QUD and Schlangen’s (2003) 
treatment of fragments in SDRT, one might be able to reconstruct the SDRT account 
presented here within the QUD framework. One intuitive and useful contribution 
of QUD needed for analyzing situated communication is that linguistic moves can 
generate expectations that guide conceptualization. And in Scratches, for example, 
Peter’s expectation of an Explanation arguably helps guide him to adopt a certain 
conceptualization of the explanandum. This “top down” information flow, from 
expectations about discourse structure to a pragmatic interpretation of an individ-
ual unit, contrasts with a common “bottom up” approach where reasoning flows 
from the observed signal to discourse structure (e.g., Hobbs et al. 1993), though in 
computational models for SDRT or RST (Muller et al. 2012, Joty et al. 2015), the 
construction of a discourse representation is modelled as a constraint satisfaction 
problem and so information flows both bottom up and top down.
Nevertheless, differences between SDRT and QUD analyses of sentence frag-
ments make such reconstruction challenging. Ginzburg’s QUD model assumes that
some information about a speech act that is performed gets encoded within the 
linguistic grammar; Ginzburg uses this aspect of the sentence fragment’s syntax to 
constrain its interactions with context, in particular with the linguistic form of the 
context. In contrast, SDRT’s approach makes no such assumptions about the linguis-
tic grammar, and the semantics/pragmatics interface has no access to linguistic form, 
but only to a partial description of the content derived from linguistic form. As in 
Scratches and Table, the form of the nonlinguistic event e that becomes a part of the 
message may be unobservable to both the speaker and the interlocutor. In such cases, 
which are common, there is no motivation to make its form a necessary premise to 
computing its semantic role in the conversation.
7 Conclusions
We have provided empirical evidence that nonlinguistic events participate in convey-
ing a coherent overall message in situated conversation by contributing the contents 
of entire discourse units to the content of a discourse. We have further argued that 
coherence-based frameworks of discourse interpretation are ideally suited for mod-
elling these kinds of contributions of nonlinguistic events, and we’ve laid out the key 
steps in extending a coherence-based theory accordingly. Linguistic and nonlinguis-
tic moves are interpreted jointly within an integrated architecture, linking linguistic 
form and context to meaning (formal details can be found in the Appendix.)
The Settlers corpus provides real data to support our rhetorical model. This data 
is helpful because it manifests a wide variety of rhetorical interactions and a mixture 
of structural configurations, including asymmetric and interleaved configurations. 
Moreover, because of the way the corpus was constructed, it provides a consistent 
context against which we can explore the nature of situated discourse over multiple 
discourse moves in an extended coherent conversation. While it may be possible 
to construct such examples, doing so would require also describing the context 
relevant for each example. The background context provided by the corpus saves 
us from having to perform this task. In addition, the corpus setup has allowed us to 
circumvent the conceptualization problem — the question of how linguistic moves 
influence the conceptualization of nonlinguistic events — which has facilitated the 
study of the codependent task of determining how conceptualizations of nonlinguistic 
events affect discourse coherence. In particular, we have been able to examine how 
nonlinguistic moves affect the salience of other linguistic and nonlinguistic moves 
and influence the constraints on the hierarchical development of discourse, and the 
data have shown that these constraints differ from those that apply in linguistically-
specified discourse. We hope to study the complex problems of individuation and 
conceptualization in future work with different data, leading to computational models 
of situated dialogue parsing.
In future work, we also hope to get a better understanding of how to classify 
different kinds of nonlinguistic events in order to articulate the different effects 
those event types have on discourse structure. We briefly noted some ways in which 
the game events from the Settlers corpus differ from coverbal gestures, but for 
the most part we have treated nonlinguistic events as a homogenous group. This 
is an idealization. For coverbal iconic gestures, a rudimentary and underspecified 
conceptualization comes from conventions about the form of the gesture, the form of 
the speech, and their relative timing (Kendon 1983, Lücking 2016, Alahverdzhieva 
& Lascarides 2010). For purely nonlinguistic events, the interpreter must retrieve 
the conceptualization from her visual observations together with the discursive links 
that speakers provide to these events. Thus, any explicit procedure for building 
a situated discourse structure with nonlinguistic eventualities, which is what is 
needed to complete our analysis, would have to involve a perceptual module that 
can individuate, and offer conceptualizations of, nonlinguistic events and states, 
following Liang (2005), Larsson (2013), and others. Once nonlinguistic moves have 
become conceptualized, segmented units that figure in the same discourse relations 
as linguistically specified units, we think it will be relatively straightforward to 
extend prior statistical models estimating the discourse structure of purely linguistic 
units (Muller et al. 2012) to models that estimate situated discourse structure.
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Appendix: Syntax and semantics of situated SDRSs
We extend here the syntax and semantics of the classic SDRT formal language 
(Asher & Lascarides 2003) to interpret situated discourse structures and show how 
the definitions apply in the case of the example Scratches introduced in Section 1.
The classic SDRT language Lsdrt builds on a language L of dynamic semantics 
with a first order syntax extended with event and individual terms, modalities, and
λ -abstractions needed for expressing questions, imperatives, deontic expressions,
and attitudes. Lsdrt includes a countable set pi1,pi2, . . . of labels for discourse units
and binary rhetorical relation symbols Rn that take these labels as arguments. For
situated SDRT, we add to Lsdrt a countable set ε1,ε2, . . . of labels for EEUs. Each
label pi and ε is indexed with the agent i who is responsible for that move: for an
elementary discourse unit (EDU), the person responsible is the speaker/author; for
an elementary event unit (EEU), the person responsible is the one who committed
to that action (where EEUs that lack a volitional agent have no superscript); and the
person responsible for a complex discourse unit (CDU), which consists of one or
more EDUs and EEUs, is the person responsible for its last EDU.
Situated SDRT formulas are defined recursively in terms of L:
Definition 8 SDRT Formulas:
i. Where φ is a formula of L, pi : φ and ε : φ are SDRT formulas;
ii. Where ρ1,ρ2 are labels and R is a rhetorical relation symbol, R(ρ1,ρ2) and
¬R(ρ1,ρ2) are SDRT formulas;
iii. Where φ , ψ are SDRT formulas, φ ∧ψ is an SDRT formula;
iv. Where φ is a conjunction of SDRT formulas, then pi : φ is an SDRT formula.
A label pi or ε is treated as a discourse referent or existentially bound variable that
denotes a speech act or nonlinguistic event, respectively. As explained in Section 5.2,
a formula of the form pi : φ or ε : φ is interpreted by a function Sw that maps the
denotation of each pi or ε to the content of a formula φ that serves as the semantic
contribution of the unit pi or ε at w.
Where i is any speaker, (20)-(25) provide an interpretation of discourse and
event units (which may be simple or complex) and their associated formulas.21 In
particular, (21) and (22) formalize the context change potential (CCP) for discourse
units and event units, respectively. f ⊆ρ f
′ indicates that f ′ extends the assignment
21 We forego an analysis of questions here, but note that we could lift the basic semantics to sets of
world-assignment pairs: a question would partition the input set of worlds so that each equivalence
class in the output partition would correspond to a possible answer (Groenendijk 2003).
f over ρ , where labels ρ,ρ1,ρ2, . . . range over EEUs and EDUs. When an action x is
performed in a world w at a time n, the updated world, wx, will share its history h
with w up to time n, but will in addition include the speech act(s) or nonlinguistic
event(s) denoted by x; that is, hm(wx) = hm(w) for all m < n, and f
′(x) ∈ hn(wx).
To model speaker commitments, we adopt a modal accessibility relation over
world assignment pairs: an agent i’s commitment slate, Ci, at a world w relative to
an assignment f is the set of all world-assignment pairs accessible from (w, f ) via
the accessibility relation for i. This allows us to use standard first-order dynamic
semantics to define how the content of an EEU or EDU updates a player’s base level
commitments. Note that when the world of evaluation shifts in (21), it shifts in i’s
commitment slateCi as well. Update is defined with relational composition ◦.
(20) for φ ∈ L, w, f‖φ‖Aw, f ′ as usual.
(21) w, f‖pi i : φ‖Aw f ′(pi i), f
′ iff f ⊆pi i f
′, Sw
f ′(pii)
( f ′(pi i),‖φ‖A), and
Ci(w f ′(pi i), f
′) = {(w′′,g) : ∃(w′, f ′) ∈Ci(w, f )
(w′, f ′‖φ‖Aw′′,g∧Sw′′
g(pii)
(g(pi i),‖φ‖A))}.
(22) w, f‖ε : φ‖Aw f ′(ε),g iff f ⊆ε f
′ and w f ′(ε), f
′‖φ‖Aw f ′(ε),g.
(23) w, f‖R(ρ1,ρ2)‖
Aw, f iff ( f (ρ1), f (ρ2)) ∈ ‖R‖
A
w.
(24) For SDRT formulas φ ,ψ : w, f‖φ ∧ψ‖Aw′, f ′ iff w, f‖φ‖A ◦‖ψ‖Aw′, f ′.
(25) For an SDRT formula φ : w, f‖¬φ‖Aw, f iff ¬∃w′∃ f ′. w, f‖φ‖Aw′, f ′.
CDUs containing discourse units are treated like EDUs in terms of commitments;
complex units composed only of event units are treated like EEUs. If a player i links
a DU with a CDU pi , then i commits to the content of pi under the same conditions
as when pi is an EDU. However, the CDU pi may contain contributions by other
players who may not commit to the CDU as a whole or to re-descriptions of discourse
moves they made. Our semantics predicts this, as we saw in our discussion of (18)
in Section 5.2.
Let us now return to our original motivating example Scratches, which involves
two dialogue moves, (1) and (2); a head nod; and some scratches s on a wall. We’ll
suppose that Peter uses familiar compositional principles to derive the EDU pi1 and its
associated logical form, an abbreviated form of which (omitting a proper treatment
of the presupposition triggers our daughter and her room, the genitive construction,
and the indexical our treated as a constant o) is given in (26) below.
(26) pia1 : ∃d,r,x,e. (sent(e,x,d)∧daughter(d)∧of (o,d)
∧ to(e,r)∧ room(r)∧of (d,r))
In terms of clause (21) of our semantics, (26) means that Anne’s commitment worlds 
now all verify the information that the daughter has been sent to her room.
Just after her utterance of (1), Anne performs the nodding gesture ε0. According 
to clause (22), the gesture changes the world so that the world’s history includes 
the gesture event, but it does not alter Anne’s commitments. Intuitively, however, 
the nod conventionally signals that there is something in the context that needs to 
be linked to pi1, and so Anne should commit to linking the denotation of the nod 
with pi1. But while the nod indicates that there is something discursively relevant 
in the nonlinguistic context that it indicates, it does not tell us what exactly that is 
or how it should be related to the discourse context. To capture these two points 
of uncertainty, we begin with the underspecified logical form in (27). First, we 
introduce an underspecified EEU label, ε?, which will ultimately be replaced with a 
discourse referent and an associated content that specifies the denotation of the nod. 
Second, we capture the underspecified relation between the denotation of the nod 
and the incoming discourse by adding an underspecified relation, R?, between ε? and 
pi1. (27) also contains information about the nod ε0 and its relation to its denotation. 
As our paper is not about gesture, we forego details here (for more details about 
how SDRT accounts treat gesture see Lascarides & Stone 2009) and simply assume 
that the nod will be characterized by some content ψ and that it will be related to its 
denotation via a relation that we call Indicates here.
(27) pia0 : (pi
a
1 : φ
a
1 ∧ ε0 : ∃u(gesture(u)∧ψ)∧
ε? : ?∧ Indicates(ε0,ε?)∧R?(pi
a
1 ,ε?))
Because Anne is responsible for the addition of the relation R to the logical form, it
follows that she is committed to the content of pi0, given clause (21). With Lascarides
& Stone (2009), we assume that however R is resolved, it will be veridical. This
means that in committing to pi0, Anne will commit to the contents associated with
the terms of the underspecified relation.
We now complete the logical form for pi0. Following Anne’s cue, Peter will next
notice the scratches on the wall. Peter takes Anne to have committed to the fact that
the scratches on the wall are at least part of the denotation of the nod. The gesture’s
partially specified denotation adds information about the scratches to the content
of the discourse and helps resolve ε?; in particular, we will add a state of the wall,
represented as ε1,
22 and conclude that ε? must include at least ε1.
(28) ε1 : ∃x∃y.(on(ε1,y,x)∧wall(y)∧ scratches(x))
22 Here we use subscripts to indicate placement in a linear ordering of EEUs and remain agnostic about
its relation to the temporal order of events.
While the state ε1 certainly plays a role in resolving ε?, however, it is not the whole
story. In particular, identifying ε? with ε1 does not by itself support a resolution
of the underspecified relation R. Why should just any old scratches on the wall be
relevant to the daughter’s being sent to her room? To be relevant, ε1 must first be
conceptualized in an appropriate way. This conceptualization comes not from a closer
inspection of ε1 but from expectations created by the discourse context. In particular,
it is natural to expect an explanation to follow Anne’s mention of the punishment
in pi1 (Asher & Lascarides 2003). Therefore, while an interpreter cannot be sure
that R? will be resolved to Explanation, her expectation of an explanation guides
her reasoning process and helps her to properly conceptualize the scratches on the
wall. By hypothesizing an Explanation, the interpreter accords a high probability to
Anne’s committing to a particular conceptualization of the scratches as the outcome
of a nonlinguistic event in which Peter and Anne’s daughter caused the scratches.
This inference leads to the construction in (29) of a CDU containing both the causing
event ε2 and the scratched state of the wall and a Result relation between them
expressing their causal dependency.
(29) ε3 : (ε1 : φε1∧ ε2 : (activity(ε2)∧agent(ε2,d))∧Result(ε2,ε1))
The complex unit ε3 can then serve as the denotation of Anne’s nod and an explana-
tion for the punishment described in pia1 , yielding the final logical form:
(30) pi0 : (pi
a
1 : φpia1 ∧ ε3 : φε3 ∧ Indicates(ε0,ε3)∧Explanation(pi
a
1 ,ε3))
Once we have the logical form in (30), it is straightforward to process the discourse
move in (2) and relate it discursively via Background to ε3, which is available
according to Definition 7 of the Right Frontier of a situated discourse structure.
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